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Limited Liability Companies in the Decade
of the 1990s: Legislative and Case Law
Developments and Their Implications
for the Future
By Charles W Murdock*
INTRODUCTION
Limited Liability Companies (LLCs) are now authorized by statute in
all states.' The decade of the 1990s witnessed an unparalleled explosion
of legislative activity in adopting a wide variety of LLC statutes. As one
court has recognized: "The allure of the limited liability company is its
unique ability to bring together in a single business organization the best
features of all other business forms-properly structured, its owners obtain
both a corporate-styled liability shield and the pass-through tax benefits
of a partnership." 2
The origins of LLC statutes were the partnership association statutes
enacted by some states in the 1800s. 3 These statutes never gained popu-
larity, however, and it was not until 1977 that the modern version of the
LLC came into existence with the enactment of legislation by Wyoming.
4
Five years later, Florida 5 followed Wyoming's lead after the Internal Rev-
* Charles W Murdock is a Professor at Loyola University Chicago School of Law where he
formerly served as Dean. He drafted the 1983 Illinois Business Corporation Act and was on
the committee that drafted the Illinois modifications to the Uniform Limited Liability Com-
pany Act. He is the author of a two volume treatise in Business Organizations.
1. See Appendix I.
2. See PB Real Estate, Inc. v. DEM II Properties, 719 A.2d 73, 74 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998)
(citing UNIF. LTD. L1AB. Co. ACT, prefatory note, 6A U.L.A. 426 (1995)).
3. In the late 1800s, Pennsylvania, Michigan, New Jersey, and Ohio created the "part-
nership association." Wayne M. Gazur & Neil M. Goff, Assessing the Limited Liability Company,
41 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 387, 393 (1990); Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability
Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAw. 375, 381 (1992). For a detailed discussion
of these entities, see Edward R. Schwartz, The Limited Partnership Association-An Alternative to
the Corporation for the Small Business with "Control" Problems?, 20 RUTGERS L. REv. 29 (1965).
4. Wyoming was the first state to adopt legislation recognizing the modern version of the
LLC. Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 158 (1977) (codified at WYO. STAT.
ANN. §§ 17-15-101 to -143 (Michie 1999).
5. Florida Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 82 (1982) (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 608.401-.471 (West 1993)). The Florida statute has since been substantially amended.
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enue Service (IRS) issued a revenue ruling that classified a Wyoming LLC
as a partnership for tax purposes. 6 But, the IRS then proposed new reg-
ulations that would classify as a corporation any entity in which members
were not liable for the entity's debts. 7 This stemmed the growth of LLCs
until a new IRS ruling in 1988 again recognized that an LLC could be
taxed as a partnership, 8 thereby sparking a resurgence of legislative activity
creating LLCs. When the IRS promulgated its "check-the-box" regula-
tions in 1996,9 a flood of LLC organizations occurred and, in many cir-
cumstances, the LLC became the entity of choice for those organizing a
new business.
In retrospect, it is remarkable that legislation by a sparsely populated
state like Wyoming, which is not thought of as a leading commercial state,
could have generated a nationwide movement. This surge of legislative
activity, in such a short period of time, coupled with changing tax con-
straints, has militated against uniformity in LLC legislation, and has pro-
duced a rather wide variety of statutory provisions. In the mid- 1990s, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the Uni-
form Commissioners) promulgated a "model" act, the Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act (ULLCA or Model Act),' 0 which has received only
a lukewarm reception.
Because of the lack of uniformity across the country, there is much to
be said for a uniform act. The most significant problem with ULLCA is
that its fiduciary duty provisions are poorly conceived, poorly drafted, and
do not accord with fiduciary duty law as it now exists. II Illinois, however,
which adopted many of the other ULLCA provisions, has modified the
ULLCA fiduciary duty provisions both to clarify the provisions and to
bring them into accord with existing fiduciary duty law. 2 Consequently,
ULLCA, as modified by the Illinois fiduciary duty provisions, 13 would be
a solid base from which to develop a more uniform body of LLC statutory
law. 14
6. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-06-082 (Nov. 17, 1980).
7. See 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709 (1980) (codified at 26 C.ER. pt. 301) (proposed Nov. 17,
1980).
8. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
9. The "check-the-box" regulations modified the regulations under § 7701 of the Internal
Revenue Code. Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,584 (1996)
(codified at 26 CER. pts. 1, 301, 602), corrected at 62 Fed. Reg. 11,769 (Mar. 13, 1997).
10. 6A U.L.A. 429-508 (West 1995 & Supp. 1999). See infra text accompanying notes
153-93 for a critique of ULLCA.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 153-91.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 188-210. See also infia Appendix 2, text of the Illinois
fiduciary duty provisions, 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/15-3 (West 2000).
13. Parenthetically, the 1933 Illinois Business Corporation Act was the "model" for the
Model Business Corporation Act. See Ray Garrett, Model Business Corporation Act, 4 BAYLOR
L. REv. 412, 424 (1952); MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 84 (1953 revision).
14. There are other provisions of ULLCA that need examination. For example, both
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Several states have adopted some or all of ULLCA,15 including Illinois,
which, as stated above, made significant changes to the fiduciary duty
provisions of ULLCA.16 As with corporate law, many practitioners reflex-
ively organize LLCs in Delaware. Accordingly, the statutory discussion will
focus mainly on ULLCA, Illinois, and Delaware, as well as the statutes in
the various states that have provided the backdrop to litigation.
To illustrate the rapid pace of change in this area, this past decade has
witnessed three generations of LLC statutes. The first generation could be
characterized as "bulletproof" statutes, because these statutes were limited
in flexibility and assured organizers that the LLC would be treated as a
partnership for tax purposes. 17 The Wyoming statute, which was the basis
for the 1980 Letter Ruling that LLCs could be taxed as a partnership,
would be an example of a bulletproof statute.' 8 The second generation
statutes could be described as "flexible" since they provided organizers
with options as to management, continuity, and transferability, but with
the downside that an entity that took advantage of these options might
not be taxed as a partnership. Illinois' initial legislation would fall in this
category. 9
The advent of the check-the-box regulations led to the third generation
of statutes. It was no longer necessary to negate such characteristics as
transferability and continuity. Consequently, ULLCA moved LLC statutes
from a partnership model toward a corporate model. In particular, it was
no longer necessary that the "events of dissolution," namely, "death, in-
sanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation or expulsion," 20 cause dissolu-
tion. What ULLCA did, simply stated, is to take these former "events of
Illinois and ULLCA tie the right to wind up an LLC upon dissolution to whether the member
has wrongfully dissociated. See infra text accompanying notes 333-41. Because dissociation
does not necessarily lead to dissolution, this is a questionable criterion. Both Illinois and
ULLCA also (i) fail to provide for survival of a cause of action in favor of any LLC after
dissolution (see infra notes 302-08 and accompanying text), and (ii) continue to provide, as did
partnership states, that a transfer who does not become a member has no management rights,
not even to information (see infra notes 270-80 and accompanying text).
15. SeeALA. CODE §§ 10-12-1 to -61 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 428-101 to -1302
(Michie 1997); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-1 to -60 (West 2000); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 35-8-101 to -1307 (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-44-101 to -1201 (Law. Co-op. 2000);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 47-34A-101 to -1207 (Michie 2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 3001-3161 (1997); W VA. CODE §§ 31B-4-101 to -1306 (1996).
16. A table categorizing the various statutory provisions regarding fiduciary duties appears
in Appendix 3. The various models for fiduciary duty statutes are set forth in Appendices
4-7.
17. A GUIDE TO LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 105 (CCH 3d ed. 1996).
18. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. See infra note 262 for discussion of Wyo-
ming's bulletproof approach.
19. 1992 Ill. Laws 2529.
20. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (1995) (subsequently revised by Rev. Rut. 88-76, 1988-
2 C.B. 360). See also supra note 8 and accompanying text. A copy of the regulation as it was
in effect prior to the check-the-box regulative is incorporated as Appendix 8.
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dissolution" and convert them into "events of dissociation, ' 2 1 with the
result that death and other adverse events impacting a member no longer
caused dissolution but, generally, entitled the "dissociated" member to
obtain payment from the entity for the fair value of her interest.
22
As the decade of the 1990s came to a close, litigation involving LLCs
had become more frequent-although in most jurisdictions there is little,
if any, case law. As we move into a new millennium, this is an appropriate
time to review the litigation issues involving LLCs that have risen in the
past decade and analyze how these issues interplayed with the various
statutory enactments.
The following sections of this Article will each address a different sub-
stantive issue. First, this Article will discuss liability issues that have arisen
with respect to LLCs. While the courts have given effect to the legislative
intent to create an "incorporated partnership," there are, nonetheless,
circumstances in which members may be personally liable. In particular,
the doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil" should be renamed "piercing
the entity veil" since courts have recognized the application of the "pierc-
ing" doctrine to LLCs.
Next, the Article reviews the cases that have dealt with the operating
agreement of an LLC. The philosophy behind the current LLC legislation
is to create an entity that is essentially contractual in nature, with the
statutory provisions providing default rules when the operating agreement
does not otherwise provide. Unfortunately, the philosophy of the lawyers
who draft statutes is not always implemented by the persons who organize
LLCs. Consequently, complicated issues can arise when there is no oper-
ating agreement or when neither the operating agreement nor the statute
deal with the issue in question.
The most significant portion of the Article, dealing with fiduciary duties,
follows. Some statutes have no explicit fiduciary provisions. Other statutes
were based upon section 21 of the Uniform Partnership Act which is so
bare bones that it affords little guidance. At the other end of the spectrum
is ULLCA, which purports to set forth an exclusive list of fiduciary duties.
Unfortunately, ULLCA is not only poorly drafted but, if it means what it
says, may markedly curtail existing case law on fiduciary duty The clearest
set of statutory provisions is found in the Illinois Act, which substantially
modified ULLCA.
The next section of the Article deals with transfer, dissolution, and dis-
sociation. At first, statutes followed a partnership model regarding disso-
lution because this was generally necessary to provide partnership tax
21. UNIF. L'TD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 601(1), (3)-(5), (7), (8), 6A U.L.A. 471 (1995). See also 805
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/35-45(1), (3)-(5), (7), (8) (West 2000); cf. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 18-801(b) (1999).
22. See UNW. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 701, 6A U.L.A. 476 (1995). See also 805 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 180/35-60. Cf. 6 DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-604 (1999).
HeinOnline  -- 56 Bus. Law.  502 2000-2001
Limited Liability Companies in the Decade of the 1990s 503
treatment. With the change in the federal tax regulations, which permitted
an LLC to elect partnership tax treatment without meeting stringent tests,
such as eliminating continuity of existence, ULLCA (and states adopting
its philosophy in this regard), converted events such as withdrawal or death
into "events of dissociation" rather than "events of dissolution." Thus,
there is a new concept, "dissociation," with which lawyers and courts must
be familiar.
The last section deals with how voting power is allocated and entitle-
ment to distributions determined. There are essentially two approaches,
per capita and per capital. The per capita approach is derived from general
partnership law where all members have equal rights in management and
to profits. Contrariwise, the per capital approach is more typical of limited
partnerships and corporations where voting rights and distributions are
basically tied to the amount of the investment.
After analyzing the complex issues generated by the statutes and case
decisions, the conclusion points out that the hectic activity in creating a
new form of business organization, and the resulting confusion, could have
been avoided if Congress had simply amended the Internal Revenue Code
to permit non-publicly traded corporations to elect to be taxed as a part-
nership. If this is not realistic, then states should consider adopting
ULLCA, but with the Illinois fiduciary duty provisions.
LIABILITY ISSUES IN GENERAL
The driving force for organizing a limited liability company is the desire
to achieve pass-through tax treatment, while at the same time enjoying
limited liability.23 When LLCs first came into vogue, in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, there was some concern as to whether the limited liability
aspect would hold up in court. With every jurisdiction now recognizing
such entities by statute,2 4 the concern as to whether limited liability will
be achieved has abated. In line with the legislative enactments, courts now
recognize that the LLC form of organization provides insulation from
liability for members of LLCs.
Within the past two years, courts in Connecticut and Arkansas have
rejected attempts to hold members personally liable for the obligations of
an LLC. In Anthony v. Blum,25 a Connecticut case, Blum had negligently
represented Anthony and, in settlement, Blum executed a $10,400 prom-
issory note on behalf of his law firm (an LLC), payable to plaintiff. Plaintiff
sued Blum on the note and argued that Blum's negligence constituted the
consideration for the note, thereby entitling plaintiff to hold Blum person-
23. See supra text accompanying note 2.
24. See supra note 1. The statutes, of course, provide that members are not liable for the
obligations of the LLC. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 303(a), 6A U.L.A. 454 (1995);
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/10-10(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-303(a).
25. Anthony v. Blum, 1999 WL 259726 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 1999).
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ally liable. The court held, however, that "the present action is not a mal-
practice action but a breach of contract action" 26 in which the law firm
was the obligor and for which "Blum is not personally liable." 2
7
An Arkansas court considered the potential liability of an LLC member
from two different perspectives. In Marina, LLC v. Burton,28 the LLC de-
faulted on a contract. The Development Institute, which Burton repre-
sented, first sought to hold the member of the LLC personally liable on
the basis that he had misrepresented that the LLC had members other
than himself. The agent for the Institute testified, however: "the financial
capability of the individuals listed [as members] was none of his business"
and that "he was aware that limited liability companies were designed to
limit an investor's liability."'29 Consequently, the court held that the Insti-
tute did not reasonably rely on the list of members.30
The Institute also sought to hold the member liable by piercing the
limited liability veil of the LLC, focusing on the undercapitalization of the
LLC. The court pointed out, however, that the Institute knew the LLC
was a new entity and that the LLC planned to finance the project through
a bank loan which was never closed. These facts "did not justify piercing
the veil."'3 1
THEORIES OF MEMBER LIABILITY
On the other hand, there are bases upon which an LLC member can
be personally liable. The Blum court recognized that a member qua actor
rather than qua member is liable for the member's own negligent acts.32
Similarly, in Burton, the member could have been liable for his personal
misrepresentation if the misrepresentation were material and if the other
party reasonably relied upon it.33 These situations arise in the corporate
setting as well. While a shareholder generally is not liable qua shareholder,
if the shareholder is also an officer or employee, she can be personally
liable for actions personally taken. 34
While the court in Burton did not believe that the facts warranted pierc-
ing the veil of the LLC, there is recognition that the "piercing the cor-
26. Id. at *2.
27. Id.
28. Burton v. Walker, No. Civ.A.97-1013, 1998 WL 240364 (Ark. App. May 6, 1998).
29. Id. at *6.
30. Id.
31. Id. at *7.
32. Anthony, 1999 WL 259726, at *2 (recognizing that Connecticut General Statutes §§ 34-
133(a)-(b) specifically prescribe the liability of members qua actor of limited liability compa-
nies).
33. Burton, 1998 WL 240364, at *7.
34. See McDonald v. Frontier Lanes, Inc., 272 N.E.2d 369, 377 (I11. App. 2d 1971); Vet-
eran Supply Co. v. Shaw, 548 N.E.2d 667, 670 (Il. App. 1989) (summarizing decisions in
this area); cf. U.C.C. § 3-403(2)(b) (1998).
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porate veil" doctrine should be renamed "piercing the entity veil." For
example, in Hollowell v. Orleans Regional Hospital,35 the court stated:
ORH is a limited liability company rather than a corporation. No
case has yet explicitly held that the "veil" of protection from liability
afforded by the limited liability company form of business in Louisi-
ana may be "pierced" in the same manner as the "veil" of protection
afforded Louisiana corporations. However, commentators through-
out the nation appear to agree that the limited liability company
"veil" may be "pierced" in the same manner as the corporate
",veil." 36
The court qualified the foregoing by quoting one commentator who ob-
served that "because the Louisiana LLC law requires fewer formalities
such as annual elections of directors, keeping minutes, or holding meetings,
failure to follow these formalities should not serve as grounds for piercing
the veil of an LLC."'3 T By way of comparison, ULLCA and Illinois expressly
provide that "[t]he failure of a limited liability company to observe the
usual company formalities or requirements relating to the exercise of its
company powers or management of its business is not a ground for im-
posing personal liability on the members or managers for liabilities of the
company."38
Nevertheless, the Louisiana court reserved the following issues, inter alia,
for trial:
(3) Whether ORH was the "alter ego" of any or all of the non-ORH
defendants ... in light of the following factors:
(a) commingling of funds;
(b) failure to follow statutory formalities for formation and the
transaction affairs;
(c) undercapitalization;
(d) failure to provide separate bank accounts and bookkeeping
records; and
(e) failure to hold regular required meetings.
(4) Whether ORH's members acted through ORH to commit fraud
or deceit, and whether the shareholders of ORH's members acted
in similar fashion. 39
Thus, the court opened the litigation to consider issues similar to those
involved in piercing the corporate veil, including whether formalities and
35. Hollowell v. Orleans Reg'l Hosp., No. CIV.A.95-4029, 1998 WL 283298 (E.D. La.
May 29, 1998).
36. Id. at *9.
37. Id.
38. UNIF. LTD. LtAB. Co. ACT § 303(b), 6A U.L.A. 454 (1995); 805 ILL. CONP. STAT.
ANN. § 180/10-10(c).
39. Hollowell, 1998 WL 283298, at *12.
HeinOnline  -- 56 Bus. Law.  505 2000-2001
506 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 56, February 2001
procedures were followed. In most states, however, the statutorily man-
dated procedures are minimal and thus the risk of running afoul of a
statutory mandate should also be minimal. For example, unlike corpora-
tion statutes, LLC statutes generally do not mandate annual meetings of
members or managers. 40 Other states, like Illinois, also explicitly provide
that failure to observe formalities is not a ground for imposing liability
41
One of the doctrines employed to pierce the corporate veil is the so-
called "holding out" or "alter ego" approach, which is used when the
shareholder does not make clear that it is the corporation (or entity), and
not the shareholder (or owner), who is the party to the contract. 42 This
approach, albeit utilizing agency theory, was used by the court in Water,
Waste & Land, Inc. v. Lanham,43 to hold a member of an LLC liable. Lanham
and Clark were the managers and members of Preferred Income Investors,
LLC. Clark contacted plaintiff to do some engineering work for a fast food
restaurant but did not clarify for whom he was acting. According to the
court:
In the course of preliminary discussions, Clark gave his business card
to representatives of Westec. The business card included Lanham's
address, which was also the address listed as the Company's principal
office and place of business in its articles of organization filed with
the secretary of state. While the Company's name was not on the
business card, the letters "PI.I." appeared above the address on the
card. However, there was no indication as to what the acronym meant
or that PI.I. was a limited liability company.44
The court also noted:
Westec directed all correspondence relating to the restaurant project
to Lanham, including a written contract and bills. Both the form of
contract and correspondence between the two parties were in Lan-
ham's name and did not refer to the Company. Lanham never signed
40. Compare MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 7.01 and 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7.05
with UNIF. LTD. LfAB. Co. AcT, §§ 103, 404, 6A U.L.A. 434 (1995) and 805 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 180/15-1, 15-5.
41. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/10-10(c). See also UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT
§ 303(b), 6A U.L.A. 454 (1995); HAW. REV. STAr. § 428-303(b) (Michie 1997); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 645 (West 1964); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-304 (2000); OR. REV.
STAT. § 63.165 (1999); S.C. Cow. ANN. § 33-44-303 (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 47-
34A-303 (2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-217-101 (1995); VI. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1303;
W VA. CODE ANN. § 31B-3-303 (1996).
42. See, e.g., Ditty v. CheckRite, Ltd., Inc., 973 E Supp. 1320, 1335 (D. Utah 1997) (stating
that under the alter ego doctrine, a plaintiff'must show both a unity of interest and ownership
such that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist,
and that if the corporate form were to be observed, fraud, injustice, or inequity would result).
43. 955 P2d 997 (Colo. 1998) (en banc).
44. Id. at 999.
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Westec's proposed written contract, and the parties do not dispute
that the oral agreement is the only binding contract in this case. 45
The issue presented to the court was who was liable for non-
performance. The court found that Westec understood that Clark was
Lanham's agent, and that Clark was therefore not liable. The court held
Lanham liable, however, on the basis of the "partially disclosed principal"
doctrine, that is, "a principal whose existence-but not identity-is known
to the other party."46 The court concluded that "[i]n light of the partially
disclosed principal doctrine, the county court's determination that Clark
and Lanham failed to disclose the existence as well as the identity of the
limited liability company they represented is dispositive under the common
law of agency."'47
In view of the foregoing, it is difficult to understand why Clark was not
also liable since he also did not disclose the existence of the LLC, the real
principal. Under the partially disclosed principal doctrine, while he made
clear he was acting as an agent, he did not identify the real principal and
thus, arguably, he also could have been liable. The court apparently treated
his misidentification of Lanham as principal as sufficient to let Clark off
the hook. But then Lanham should be liable on the undisclosed principal
doctrine, not the partially disclosed principal doctrine. Lanham apparently
never indicated that he was acting as an agent. Thus, he should be liable
as a principal because the "true" principal, the LLC, was never disclosed.
Lanham, in seeking to avoid liability, argued that the Connecticut statute
had a constructive notice provision, i.e., that filing the articles of organi-
zation was constructive notice that the LLC is an LLC; therefore he should
not be liable for the LLCs obligations. The court responded that the
statute:
places third parties on constructive notice that a fully identified com-
pany-that is, identified by a name such as "Preferred Income In-
vestors, LLC," or the like-is a limited liability company provided
that its articles of organization have been filed with the secretary of
state. Section 7-80-208 is of little force, however, in determining
whether a limited liability company's agent is personally liable on the
theory that the agent has failed to disclose the identity of the
company.48
In distinguishing between agency doctrine and the doctrine of piercing
the entity veil, the court determined that
[t] he undisclosed principal theory is a rule of law and applies regard-
less of a defendant's intent to engage in wrongful conduct; however,
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1002.
47. id.
48. Id. at 1004.
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the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is based in equity so that
a failure to disclose must coexist with wrongful conduct or improper
purpose or intent for the latter theory to apply and render personal
liability.49
Thus, agents of an entity such as an LLC must take care to insure that
both the fact of their agency and the identity of the entity is disclosed.
Otherwise, they risk liability on agency principles which, as applied by this
court, are more draconian in application than the doctrine of piercing the
entity veil since equitable considerations cannot relieve a defendant from
liability.
PIERCING THE ENTITY VEIL
Several cases have presented interesting twists with respect to the doc-
trine of piercing the entity veil. In Tom Thumb Food Market, Inc. v. TLH
Properties, LLC,50 the court looked to equitable considerations in relieving
Hartmann, the individual defendant, from liability on a lease he had exe-
cuted on behalf of the LLC. Hartmann had represented that he owned
the land in question. He had not purchased the land, however, but was
operating under an oral agreement with another person, Smith, to pur-
chase the land and develop the site. Hartmann entered into a twelve year
lease on behalf of the LLC with Tom Thumb, but when Hartmann sought
to obtain financing to purchase the land, the bank countered with a request
for information about the financial status of Tom Thumb, in order to
determine whether the proposed lease would be adequate security for its
mortgage. At first, Tom Thumb delayed sending financial information
and, when it did send such information, it indicated that Tom Thumb had
a negative net worth.
The trial court pierced the entity veil and held Hartmann liable to Tom
Thumb. The appellate court reversed for two reasons, however. First, al-
though Hartmann did misrepresent his ownership of the land, he did form
the LLC to develop the land for a Tom Thumb food market and, at one
point, did have access to an option to acquire the land. More importantly,
the court held that Tom Thumb did not have clean hands, stating:
The record is undisputed that when Hartmann attempted to obtain
financing for the project, Tom Thumb delayed sending financial
statements to Hartmann's bank. The record is also undisputed that
when the bank ultimately received Tom Thumb's financial infor-
mation, it refused to finance the project because Tom Thumb had a
negative net worth. Tom Thumb's conduct contributed to the delay
and ultimately caused the bank to refuse financing. This conduct
49. Id.
50. No. C9-98-1277, 1999 WL 31168 (Minn. App. Ct.Jan. 26, 1999).
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contributed to breach of the lease and it would be unjust to allow
Tom Thumb to recover against Hartmann personally.5 1
Another piercing the veil case, Abu-Nassar v. Elders Futures, Inc.,52 involved
a Lebanese LLC, which raised the issue of piercing the entity veil from
the perspective of both New York law and Lebanese law. The entity was
organized under Lebanese law and Lebanese law imposed additional ob-
ligations on a business. Suit was filed in New York and the court recognized
that, while the law of the state of organization normally determines issues
related to the internal affairs of an entity, different conflict of laws prin-
ciples exist where the rights of third parties external to the entity are at
issue. Courts have recognized that piercing the entity veil is "generally a
creditors remedy. '5 3 Consequently, the court discussed the issue under
both New York law and Lebanese law. The court's analysis under New
York law was fairly typical. It considered the following:
(1) intermingling of personal and corporate funds and siphoning of
corporate funds by a principal; (2) failure to observe corporate for-
malities and keep proper books and records; (3) failure to pay divi-
dends; (4) inadequate capitalization; (5) insolvency; (6) perpetration
of fraud by shareholders in maintaining the corporate form. 54
In its analysis, the court focused on the issues of commingling and adequate
capitalization.
Lebanese law contained several aspects, however, that, from the per-
spective of U.S. law, were unusual. Under Lebanese law: (i) the capital of
the corporation was required to exceed 50,000 Lebanese pounds; (ii) the
amount of the company's capital was to figure prominently on all printed
material and other documents emanating from the company; and (iii) the
company was required to hold an annual meeting to review the company's
business before declaring or distributing profits.55 In point of fact, a re-
quirement of minimum capital is fairly typical in the LLC statutes of Eu-
ropean and other countries. 56 These statutes reflect and reinforce a gen-
erally recognized principle that the price of limited liability is adequately
capitalizing the entity. The requirement that such capital be stated on all
correspondence and documents, however, was unusual.
51. Id. at *3.
52. Abu-Nassar v. Elders Futures, Inc., No. 88C1V7906, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3794
(S.D.N.Y Mar. 8, 1991). While the court frequently refers to piercing the corporate veil, the
entity Abu-Nassar organized was a Lebanese limited liability company,
53. Tom Thumb Food Market, Inc., 1999 WL 31168, at *3; Abu-Nassar, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3794, at *14-*15.
54. Abu-Nassar, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3794, at *35.
55. Id. at *17.
56. See, e.g., Germany: GMBH § 5 (50,000 Deutsche Marks), AG § 7 (100,000 Deutsche
Marks); Spain: S.A. Art. 4 (10,000,000 pesetas).
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With respect to the requirement of 50,000 pounds of capital, the court
seemed to interpret this as an ongoing requirement. Such an approach
really does not make sense, because, in effect, it destroys the whole concept
of limited liability. If there is a continuing obligation to replace the capital
of the company as it is reduced by losses, the funds of the shareholders
would constantly be at risk without limit. The harshness of this approach
in the present situation may have been ameliorated by another provision
of Lebanese law providing an opportunity for a company to recapitalize
within one year before any negative consequences attach. Arguably, if the
company dissolves within that period, there would be no further obligation
on the shareholders but, if it continued to operate with inadequate capital,
the shareholders could be personally liable to replace the depleted capital.
The two core elements in piercing the corporate veil have been: (i) whether
there is such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate person-
alities of a corporation and the individual no longer exist; and(ii) whether
recognition of the corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injus-
tice, or result in inequity.57 These elements are also considered in piercing
an LLC veil. Two cases have reviewed the first part of this test and deter-
mined that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the shareholder
in question so conducted the entity's business that it had no separate ex-
istence of its own. New Horizon Supply Cooperative v. Haack58 was a small
claims case in which the evidence was very sketchy. Apparently the trial
court pierced the entity veil on the basis that the LLC was essentially a
partnership because it was taxed as a partnership. The appellate court
held that it was an error to consider partnership tax treatment as conclu-
sive of the nature of the entity under state law, reinforcing the recognization
that LLCs generally do provide limited liability for their members. 59 In
addition, the appellate court found that there was little in the record to
support a conclusion that the entity had no separate existence of its own.60
In fact, there was little in the record period.
In Ditty v. CheckRite, Ltd, 6 1 plaintiffs sought to hold a lawyer personally
liable for a law firm's unlawful collection practices on the grounds of pierc-
ing the entity veil. They argued that the veil should be pierced because he
was the "sole shareholder, sole director and president" of the law firm and
because he "designed the 'covenant not to sue' scheme, trained the firm's
employees, and supervised the firm's collection practices. ' 62 The court
disagreed with plaintiffs because the fact that the lawyer "played an active
role in the firm's businesses is, at best, only marginally probative of the
57. Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chem. & Oil Corp., 753 E2d 565, 569-70 (7th Cir. 1985).
58. 590 N.W2d 282 (Wis. App. Ct. 1999).
59. id.
60. Id.
61. 973 E Supp. 1320 (D. Utah 1997).
62. Id. at 1336. Even though plaintiff referred to defendant as a shareholder, he was a
member of an LLC.
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factors considered when determining whether to pierce the corporate
veil."'63 The factors that the court determined to be significant in deter-
mining whether to pierce the corporate veil included:
Undercapitalization of a close corporation; failure to observe cor-
porate formalities; siphoning of corporate funds by the dominant
shareholders; non-functioning of other officers or directors; and the
use of the corporation as a facade for the operations of the dominant
shareholder.64
While the lawyer's activities may have met the last factor, there was no
evidence on the other factors. Parenthetically, nonetheless, the lawyer was
held personally liable as a "debt collector" under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.65
OPERATING AGREEMENTS AND OPERATING ISSUES
Notwithstanding all the care and detail that has gone into drafting LLC
statutes around the country this past decade, recent litigation demonstrates
that it is impossible for the legislature to so "cover the waterfront" that
judicial construction and interpretation will not be necessary. The cases
also demonstrate the need for counsel to be familiar with the LLC Act in
question and with the other "entity" statutes. In general, counsel is given
considerable latitude in drafting the operating agreement, but this latitude
makes it all the more critical that counsel provide expert representation
and not top-of-the-head reaction when dealing with clients in the forma-
tion and operation of LLCs.
Although, in the corporate world, by-laws have become boilerplate with
(often) insufficient regard given to them, the operating agreement in the
LLC world is the heart of the relationship among the LLC, its members,
and managers. Although forms exist, there are not yet "standard forms"
that make organization of an LLC a simple and inexpensive task. More-
over, because the statutes anticipate a detailed and specific operating agree-
ment, most sophisticated practitioners craft an operating agreement for an
LLC that is specifically tailored to the clients before them. This generally
makes formation of an LLC substantially more expensive than formation
of a corporation, where boilerplate articles and by-laws are initially used
and later (often years later) a more sophisticated and client-specific share-
holders' or buy/sell agreement is proposed.
63. Id. Although the court referred to the corporate veil, the entity in question was an
LLC.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1337. See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692(o) (1994).
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But what if there is no operating agreement signed by all the members? 66
In Advanced Orthopedics, L.L.C. v. Moon,6 7 defendant argued that he did not
intend to form an LLC and that, alternatively, his failure to sign a proposed
operating agreement constituted a withdrawal, resulting in mandatory dis-
solution. 68 The court first held that "attaining a certain level of under-
standing regarding L.L.C.'s is not a prerequisite to the formation and
participation in one" 69 and that the certificate of organization is "conclu-
sive evidence" that an LLC has been duly organized. 70 With respect to his
argument that his failure to sign the operating agreement worked a dis-
solution, the court stated "we are aware of no requirement in the law that
an L.L.C. have an operating agreement to be viable."' 71
In Child Care of Irvine, LLC v. Facchina,72 the more complex issue was
whether or not there was an operating agreement. The members had
originally formed a corporation and executed a shareholders' agreement,
which provided both for management of the corporation and arbitration
of disputes. The agreement provided that "Shareholders agree to have
Dante D. Facchina appointed and elected as Chairman of the Board,
President, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary of Child Care of Irvine,
Inc., as long as he remains a Shareholder and performs faithfully, effi-
ciently, and competently. '73 According to the court, "those provisions
would appear to permit the shareholders to terminate Facchina as Child
Care Inc.'s manager for not working full time, or without full effort, or for
being unprofessional, inefficient, unfaithful, or incompetent. ' 74
66. Section 103(a) provides that members of an LLC "may" enter into an operating
agreement and that such equipment "need not be in writing." UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT
§ 103(a), 6A U.L.A. 434 (1995). Delaware provides that an operating agreement can be
"written or oral." DiLL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7). The Illinois statute would seem to
require that the operating agreement be in writing and be signed by all members because it
is an agreement or contract. See 805 ILL. CoMp. STAT. ANN. 180/15-5(a). If there is only
one member, however, the operating agreement need not be in writing and need not contain
the elements of a contract. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/15-5(c).
67. 656 So. 2d 1103 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
68. In ULLCA, Illinois, and Delaware, withdrawal does not of itself dissolve an LLC. See
UNH:. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 601, 6A U.L.A. 471 (1995); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/
35-1; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-801(b). In ULLCA and Illinois, withdrawal, however,
constitutes dissociation. UNte. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 601, 6A U.L.A. 471 (1995); 805 ILL.
COMi'. STAT. ANN. 180/35-45. This, as a result, may give rise to a return of the member's
distributional interest. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. AcT § 701, 6A U.L.A. 476 (1995); 805 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/35-60; see also infra text accompanying notes 273-81.
69. Advanced Orthopedics, 656 So. 2d at 1105.
70. Id. The court did indicate that defendant could challenge its organization but that he
would have the burden of proof. Cf 805 ILL. COr,41'. STAT. ANN. 180/5-40.
71. Advanced Orthopedics, 656 So. 2d at 1105-06.
72. Child Care of Irvine v. Facchina, No. CIV.A. 16227, 1998 WL 409363 (Del. Ch.July
15, 1998).
73. Id. at *1.
74. Id.
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Because the parties were unable to obtain subchapter S tax status for
the corporation, they executed a "shareholder consent" on December 17,
1996, for the corporation to merge into a Delaware LLC. Defendant Fac-
china had organized a Delaware LLC on December 5 and, as sole officer
of the corporation and managing member of the LLC, executed the
Merger Agreement on December 24. He filed a Certificate of Merger in
Delaware on December 20, 1996, and the Agreement and Plan of Merger
with California on January 14, 1997. The Merger Agreement stated that
the LLC "would be governed by the operating agreement in effect prior
to the effective date of the merger" and that Facchina would be the general
manager of the LLC. 75
Apparently unbeknownst to the other members, Facchina had engaged
a law firm to prepare a draft operating agreement, which Facchina re-
ceived on December 23, 1996.76 Facchina asserted that he immediately
gave the draft agreement to another member but the other member
claimed he first saw the draft onJanuary 16 or 17, 1997.77 Another mem-
ber claimed he never saw the draft until February 10, 1998. In any event,
it was undisputed that the draft agreement was never signed.
At this stage there existed two documents: one was signed by the parties
and labeled a shareholders' agreement; the other was unsigned and labeled
an operating agreement. The shareholders' agreement authorized Fac-
china's termination for cause as therein defined, while the draft operating
agreement provided no mechanism to terminate the manager. These doc-
uments were then put in issue when Facchina allegedly violated California
laws relating to child care 78 and the other members (who owned the other
two-third interest in the LLC) voted to terminate Facchina's employment.
Plaintiffs, of course, argued that the executed shareholders' agreement
was transformed into the operating agreement when the business was
transformed from the corporate form to the LLC form. Facchina argued
that the unexecuted draft was the operating agreement because the other
members knew of its existence or that, alternatively, the Merger Agreement
itself (apparently a rather bare bones document) was the operating agree-
ment. He thus argued that there was no authority to remove him and that
plaintiffs' sole remedy was to seek judicial dissolution of the LLC.
Plaintiffs also argued that, as majority members, they had a default right
to terminate the manager. Unfortunately for plaintiffs, section 18-402 of
the Delaware statute provided in part that "a manager shall cease to be a
manager as provided in the limited liability company agreement. '79 As
stated above, there was no document explicitly identified as an operating
75. Id. at *2,
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at *3.
79. Id. at *4,
HeinOnline  -- 56 Bus. Law.  513 2000-2001
514 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 56, February 2001
agreement and signed by all the members. Consequently, plaintiffs focused
on the opening language of the foregoing statute,80 to wit, that unless
otherwise provided in the operating agreement, members owning a ma-
jority of the profit interests can manage the LLC.
This portion of the statute deals with a member-managed LLC, how-
ever, whereas Child Care was a manager-managed LLC. This being the
case, the Delaware statute merely provides that a manager ceases to be a
manager "as provided in the limited liability company agreement" without
setting forth any default provision in the event that the operating agree-
ment does not deal with this issue or if, as possibly in the case at bar, there
was no operating agreement. The Delaware statute epitomizes "contrac-
tarianism;" while the Delaware bar extols this as a virtue, this can also be
a serious flaw when the statute offers no default provision when the parties,
as in the case at bar, fail to deal with an issue.8 1
The chancellor vacated a preliminary injunction that barred Facchina
from acting as general manager (even though permitting Facchina to con-
tinue as manager might cause plaintiffs to lose their license and franchise
to operate a child care business) and denied each side's motions for sum-
mary judgment so that he could hear testimony at trial.8 2 The court also
stated that "I have not an inkling which side will ultimately prevail."
8 3
Later, ChiefJustice Veasey, in a rather gratuitous extolling of the virtues
of Delaware's statutes and the benefits of organizing in Delaware, may
have explained why the chancellor had no inkling of what to do, pointing
out that "[t]o understand the overall structure and thrust of the [LLC]
80. Id. Section 18-402 provides in its entirety:
Unless otherwise provided in a limited liability company agreement, the management
of a limited liability company shall be vested in its members in proportion to the then
current percentage or other interest of members in the profits of the limited liability
company owned by all of the members, the decision of members owning more than 50
percent of the said percentage or other interest in the profits controlling; provided how-
ever, that if a limited liability company agreement provides for the management, in
whole or in part, of a limited liability company by a manager, the management of the
limited liability company, to the extent so provided, shall be vested in the manager who
shall be chosen by the members in the manner provided in the limited liability company
agreement. The manager shall also hold the offices and have the responsibilities ac-
corded to the manager by the members and set forth in a limited liability company
agreement. Subject to § 18-602 of this title, a manager shall cease to be a manager as
provided in a limited liability company agreement. A limited liability company may
have more than I manager. Unless otherwise provided in a limited liability company
agreement, each member and manager has the authority to bind the limited liability
company.
DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (1999).
81. In other areas, the Delaware statute fails to provide a default provision. See id. § 18-
601 (interim distributions).
82. Child Care, 1998 WL 409363, at *1.
83. Id. at *6.
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Act, one must wade through provisions that are prolix, sometimes oddly
organized, and do not always flow evenly." 84 He extolled the "broadest
possible discretion" that Delaware draftsmen have in crafting agreements
and the "certainty that their partnership agreement will be enforced in
accordance with its terms."8 5 This is true of other jurisdictions as well,
however. According to ChiefJustice Veasey, the purpose of the LLC Act
is merely to furnish default provisions when the members' agreement is
silent. The Delaware statute, however, does not always provide default
provisions. 86
As the Child Care case demonstrates, the Delaware statute was flawed in
failing to provide a default provision in a critical area. If Delaware is so
freedom-of-contract oriented, why did it not enforce a written contract
that provided a manager could be removed for cause? True, the contract
was labeled a shareholders' agreement. But the purpose of such an agree-
ment was to specify the relations among the parties. An ordinary person
would not see any difference between removing the manager of an LLC
or the general manager of a corporation. What normal people focus upon
is the management of the business. The form of legal entity is irrelevant.
Only lawyers can take the obvious and obfuscate it.
By way of comparison, consider how a well-drafted statute, such as
ULLCA or Illinois, would provide a workable default mechanism in a case
like Child Care. Both statutes provide that, in a manager-managed LLC, a
manager:
(i) must be designated, appointed, elected, removed, or replaced by a
vote, approval, or consent of a majority of the members; and
(ii) holds office until a successor has been elected and qualified, unless
the manager sooner resigns or is removed.87
This is a provision that could be modified by the operating agreement 88
but, if not modified, would be dispositive of the issue in Child Care. Three
possibilities existed in Child Care: (i) the executed shareholders' agreement
was the operating agreement, (ii) the unexecuted draft was the operating
agreement, or (iii) there was no operating agreement. If the shareholders'
agreement were the operating agreement, it specifically authorized ter-
mination for cause. If the unexecuted draft were the operating agreement,
because it was silent on termination, the default provisions of the statutes
would apply and, as was set forth above, under ULLCA or in Illinois, a
84. Elf Atochem North America, Inc. v. Jaffari and Malek, LLC, 727 A.2d 286, 291 (Del.
1999).
85. Id.
86. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
87. UNIF. LTD. LLAB. Co. ACT § 404 (b)(3)(i)(ii), 6A U.L.A. 457 (1995); 805 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 180/15-1 (b)(3)(A), (B).
88. UNIF. LTD. LtAB. Co. ACT § 103(a), 6A U.L.A. 434 (1995); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 180/15-5.
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majority of the members could remove the manager. Both ULLCA and
Illinois provide that, "[t]o the extent the operating agreement does not
otherwise provide, this [Act] governs relations among members, managers,
and company."8 9 This means that the statute provides the default rule
when a matter is not covered in the operating agreement. Accordingly
under both statutes, the majority of members could remove the manager,
because this is the statutory default rule. Finally, if there were no operating
agreement, then clearly the default provisions of the statutes would control.
In Illinois, and states adopting ULLCA, this matter could be resolved on
summary judgment, thereby avoiding the cost, delay, and risk of loss of
business that Delaware imposed.
Another approach to resolving the Child Care issue is suggested by the
decision of the Supreme Court of Connecticut in C & J Builders and Re-
modelers, LLC v. Gersenheimer,90 where the issue was whether a contract exe-
cuted while plaintiff was a sole proprietorship was binding upon defen-
dants, the other party to the contract, when the sole proprietorship was
converted to an LLC. The court, in resolving this issue, looked to explicit
statutory provisions that governed the conversion of a general or limited
partnership to an LLC. In such situations, the statutes provided that all
property of the predecessor vested in the successor and all obligations of
the predecessor continued as obligations of the successor. While there was
no applicable statutory provision to merge a sole proprietorship into an
LLC, the court stated:
We can discern no reason to distinguish between the conversion of a
sole proprietorship to a limited liability company and the conversion
of a general partnership to a limited liability company pursuant to
§ 34-200. "Where possible, courts should, as a matter of common law
adjudication, 'assure that the body of the law-both common and
statutory-remains coherent and consistent."' We conclude, there-
fore, that where a sole proprietorship converts to a limited liability
company, all of the interests and obligations incurred by, or charge-
able against, the sole proprietorship or its assets are transferred to the
limited liability company by operation of law. Moreover, like the gen-
eral partners in a converting general or limited partnership, the sole
proprietor retains personal liability for all preconversion debts and
obligations incurred by the sole proprietorship. 91
While the Connecticut court did not see its decision as extraordinary, it
certainly was. Heretofore, mergers and conversions of one entity into an-
other have been exclusively within the legislative domain. In effect, the
89. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. Ac § 103(a), 6A U.L.A. 434 (1995); 805 ILL. CoMP. STAT.
ANN. 180/15-5(a) (substantially identical).
90. 733 A.2d 193 (Conn. 1999).
91. Id. at 197 (citations omitted).
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court created a common law merger. While, in the product liability area,
some courts have determined as a matter of public policy that liabilities
follow assets, these cases deal only with particular liabilities and deal not
at all with asset transfer.92 Moreover, a sole proprietorship heretofore has
not been recognized as an entity separate and apart from the individual
operating it. The assets and liabilities are his or hers, not its.
Nevertheless, a sole proprietorship can be identified in many situations
(through bank accounts, use of assets, and contracts) as a separate eco-
nomic entity, just as readily as a partnership and possibly as a corporation.
Thus, the decision in the present case is not so much troubling as overkill.
Although the court did not deal with this issue, the contract was most likely
assignable. The issue in question was whether the contract provision that
required disputes to be arbitrated would be binding upon the defendants
after the sole proprietor converted his business to an LLC. Because defen-
dants had contractually agreed to arbitrate disputes, why should not the
LLC, as the assignee of the contract, be able to enforce the contracts? 93
In a similar view, with respect to the Child Care case, should not the
shareholders' agreement of the corporation be binding upon the LLC?
After all, there was a statutory merger involved in which liabilities and assets,
including contract rights and obligations, were binding upon the successor
by operation of law.94
The first question that arises, however, is whether the shareholders' con-
tract is a contract of the corporation that could be transferred to the LLC.
In many shareholder agreements, particularly those embodying buy-sell
type provisions, the corporation is a party to the contract. The provision
of the agreement dealing with management is akin to an employment
agreement and the rights and liabilities under employment agreements are
routinely transferred by operation of law pursuant to merger statutes.
There are, however, two difficulties with this approach. The first is that
the corporation may not have been a party to the shareholder agreement.
The implications of this will be discussed below. The second is that, instead
of a merger of two like entities, such as corporations with which we are
now familiar and comfortable, Child Care involved a merger of two dissim-
ilar entities, each with its own jargon and peculiarities. By way of illustra-
tion, how can a surviving LLC have a "shareholders" agreement when,
according to the conventional wisdom, there are no shares issued in an
LLC and accordingly (and per the statute) an LLC has "members" and
not "shareholders."
92. See Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976) and Ray v. Alad
Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977), and their progeny. These cases involve situations where the
assets are transferred explicitly by the parties, whereupon the courts hold that liabilities follow
assets.
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317 (1981).
94. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18 -2 09 (g) (1999).
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This, however, is exalting form over substance. What difference does it
make whether we call investors in an entity "shareholders" or "members?"
A similar "dilemma" arises in the corporate world where statutes generally
employ the term "president," whereas businesses appoint or elect "chief
operating officers" (COOs) and "chief executive officers" (CEOs). Cor-
porate by-laws typically define the president as the chief executive officer.
In the corporate world, the name or designation dilemma is no dilemma
at all.
Moreover, some LLCs do have shares and issue certificates and some
managers are called directors or managing directors.95 Because LLCs are
essentially creatures of contract, with the statute generally only providing
default provisions, the organizers of an LLC should be able to create what-
ever structure, and use whatever nomenclature, they desire. With the pro-
liferation of statutory provisions authorizing mergers between and among
partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability companies, and cor-
porations, it behooves courts to keep an open mind when dealing with the
resulting entities and their relations to the predecessor entities. If an in-
vestor or manager was contractually obligated to the predecessor, he or
she also ought to be obligated to the successor.
But what if the predecessor entity was not a party to the contract?
Arguably, a merger does not transfer obligations to which the predecessor
was not a party. The question then arises as to what happens to the con-
tract between the shareholders. Is it extinguished? If not, what effect does
it have after the merger?
To what does a shareholder agreement generally apply? Typically, it
covers the nature and amount of the investment, provisions as to distri-
butions, provisions relating to management including directorships, voting,
employment, compensation and termination, and provisions relating to
dispute resolution.96 Other than jargon and the fact that corporation stat-
utes provide more default specificity than do LLC statutes, the essentials
of a shareholders' agreement and the essentials of an operating agreement
may be very similar. The parties in Child Care, in their shareholders' agree-
ment, had already contracted with respect to their investor and manage-
ment relationship. Rather than extinguishing the contract on some theory
akin to frustration of essential purpose, why not enforce the contract as
reformed 97 to make the jargon compatible with the statute under which
the successor is organized?
The problem is that lawyers-and often courts at the prodding of law-
yers-get caught up in labels and "black magic." The focus is on the form,
95. See, e.g., Froelich v. Erickson, 96 . Supp. 2d 507, 512-13 (D. Md. 2000), discussed infra
at notes 212-20 and accompanying text.
96. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2A.40 (West 1993); cf. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT,
Close Corp. Supp. § 20, Official Comment (3)-(7), 4 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. CC-32
(3d ed. 1997 Supp.).
97. See, e.g., Katcher v. Ohsman, 97 A.2d 180, 183-84 (Super. Ct. N.J. 1953).
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the mechanics, and the abstract propositions, rather than substance and
reality. Businesspeople typically understand the essence of what they wish
to establish concerning their relationship as investors and managers. Law-
yers then sometimes convolute these concepts into complicated agree-
ments. This is not to say that there are not reasons for agreements to be
complicated, but the essence can be lost in the detail and the detail can
mark the essence.
The pragmatic approach taken by the court in C & J Builders should
support the argument to carry over investor contracts in predecessor en-
tities into the successor entity. While this creates some problems of con-
struction because of the disparity in language, it gives effect to the relevant
portion of the parties' agreement.
The construction of an operating agreement for a law firm which con-
verted from a partnership to an LLC was a major issue before the court
in Goldstein and Price, L. C. v. Tonkin & Mandl, L. C.,98 together with the issue
of whether there was an oral modification of such agreement. At the time
of conversion, inJanuary 1994, the members of the firm agreed that their
partnership agreement would be the operating agreement of the LLC until a
new operating agreement, consistent with the LLC statute could be pre-
pared. For a law firm organized as an LLC not to have an operating
agreement is like the cobbler's children having no shoes. In the author's
experience, however, Goldstein does not present a unique situation.
A draft agreement was prepared and discussed on October 22, 1994,
but one member, Tonkin, had reservations about it. His concerns were to
be addressed at a subsequent meeting on November 22, but ten minutes
before the meeting, Tomkin advised the firm that he was withdrawing. His
written notice of withdrawal purported to set the effective date on Decem-
ber 21, 1994.
Section 12 of the operating (partnership) agreement provided that
"[t]he withdrawal shall become effective on the last day of the calendar
month after service of the withdrawal notice hereafter referred to as the
'date of withdrawal."' 99 The firm contended that this provision made his
withdrawal effective November 30, 1994, and thus Tonkin was not entitled
to additional accounts receivable generated in December, nor to his
Keough contribution due in December.
To resolve this issue, the court looked to another provision of the op-
erating (partnership) agreement which specified that a withdrawing mem-
ber (partner) would receive his share of capital in six equal monthly in-
stallments, "with the first payment due on the thirtieth day following the
service of the notice of withdrawal." 100 According to the court, it would
not make sense to interpret the language of the agreement to mean that
98. Goldstein v. Tonkin, 974 S.W2d 543 (Mo. App. 1998).
99. Id. at 546 n.1.
100. Id. at 551.
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withdrawal would become effective the last day of the calendar month after
service of the withdrawal notice as referring to the last day of December
because, under the payment provision, the first payment would be due 30
days after service of the withdrawal notice, or December 22.
According to the court, this interpretation would have the first payment
becoming due before the withdrawal became effective. In effect, the court
rewrote the language to read that withdrawal would become effective on
the last day of the month in which service of the notice was made. This
case demonstrates the need to have an operating agreement with provi-
sions that are clear and precise. The ambiguity in the case at bar deprived
plaintiff of his share of the December accounts receivable, which may have
been equitable but, more importantly, deprived him of his Keough con-
tribution for the year.
FIDUCIARY DUTIES
From a case law standpoint, what is surprising about the last decade is
the relative absence of litigation relating to the fiduciary duties of members
or managers in LLCs. Although there have been several cases in which
fiduciary duties were implicated, many of them dealt with collateral is-
sues,10 1 and accordingly, there are relatively few cases dealing specifically
with whether or not a particular set of facts involved a breach of fiduciary
duty.
In the LLC legislation, there have been a variety of statutory provisions
dealing with fiduciary duties. Moreover, in some statutes, there are no
specific provisions dealing with fiduciary duties. In point of fact, one ef-
fective way of dealing with the issue of fiduciary duties is to leave this
subject strictly to case law development. A second approach is that adopted
by the Uniform Commissioners in ULLCA, 10 2 and enacted in several
states. 10 3 ULLCA purports to define an exclusive list of fiduciary duties.
Illinois has modified the ULLCA approach by making the list non-exclusive
and eliminating the conflicts and ambiguities of ULLCA.10 4 Several other
states 105 have fiduciary duty provisions patterned after section 21 of the
Uniform Partnership Act' 0 6 or section 144 of the Delaware General Cor-
101. See, e.g., Handelsman v. Bedford Village Assoc. L.P., 213 E3d 48, 51 (2d Cir. 2000)
(dealing with the issue of whether the plaintiffs had established their entitlement to an evi-
dentiary hearing based upon subject matter jurisdiction); Diaz v. Fernandez, 910 R2d 96
(Colo. App. Ct. 1995) (addressing whether plaintiffs had established their entitlement to an
evidentiary hearing).
102. See UNI-. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 409 (amended 1996), 6A U.L.A. 464 (1995).
103. See states listed in Appendix 2.
104. 805 li-L. COMP. STAr. ANN. 180/15-3 (West Supp. 2000).
105. See states listed in Appendix 2.
106. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 21 (1914), 6 U.L.A. § 608 (1995).
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poration Act.10 7 Another unique approach was found in the original Illi-
nois Act, which provided that a member had obligations and duties similar
to a shareholder in the corporate context, and a manager had duties and
obligations similar to those of a director in the corporate context. 108
The first approach, i.e., not addressing fiduciary duties in the statute
itself, is basically the corporate law approach. Corporate statutes in general
do not have extensive provisions with respect to fiduciary duties, but rather
the development of fiduciary duties has been left to the case law. For
example, section 8.60 of Illinois 0 9 and section 144 of Delaware I 1 0 deal
only with one aspect of the duty of loyalty namely, conflict of interest.
Similarly, section 8.65 of Illinois lII and section 174 of Delaware1 2 deal
only with a very limited aspect of the duty of care, namely, distributions
in violation of statute. Other aspects of fiduciary duty in the corporate
context, such as disclosure, the corporate opportunity doctrine and com-
peting with the corporation, have been left solely to case law development.
Clearly, factual issues such as fairness and disinterestedness also must be
left to the case law 11 3
Moreover, one of the most important fiduciary duty developments in
corporate law has been the recognition of the duty of fair dealing by ma-
jority shareholders to minority shareholders. This development is entirely
a case law development and has been predicated upon partnership prin-
ciples, that is, that shareholders in a closely held corporation bear the same
fiduciary responsibilities to each other as would partners in the partnership
context. 114
107. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 18-144 (1991 & Supp. 1998). See states listed in Appen-
dix 2.
108. 1992 I1. Laws 2529, § 10-10 (amended by PA. 90-424, § 10, effectiveJan. 1, 1998).
109. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8.60 (West Supp. 2000).
110. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 18-144 (1991 & Supp. 1998).
111. 805 ILL. CoMp. STAT. ANN. 5/8.65 (West 1993).
112. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 18-174 (1991 & Supp. 1998).
113. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UPO, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (holding that fairness
includes both fair price and fair dealing), aft'd, 497 A.2d 792 (Del. 1985); Shlensky v. South
Parkway Bldg. Corp., 166 N.E.2d 793, 796, 805 (II1. 1960) (holding that fairness is the key
issue and that an employee and a lawyer for a corporation were not disinterested with respect
to a transaction between the corporation and an individual who controlled the corporation);
Gries Sports Enters., Inc. v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., 496 N.E.2d 959, 967 (Ohio
1986) (holding that an officer and general counsel were not disinterested and that directors
had the burden of proving fairness).
114. Two Massachusetts cases, Rodd v. Donohue Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975)
and Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976) were landmark cases
in the development of fiduciary duty of majority shareholders to the minority. See Charles W
Murdock, The Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Its Impact on Valuation of
Minority Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425, 433-36 [hereinafter Effective Remedies]. See also
CHARLES W MURDOCK, 7 ILLINOIS PRAcTIcE-BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 10.1-10.5
(West 1996 & Supp. 2000) [hereinafter BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS].
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In the partnership context, the Uniform Partnership Act does have a
provision dealing with certain fiduciary duties, namely, conflict of interest
and partnership opportunity.' 5 Notwithstanding this statutory provision,
Illinois courts, for example, when dealing with fiduciary duties in the part-
nership context, seem to have generally ignored the statutory provision
and have dealt with the subject of fiduciary duties by case law."16 Courts
in other jurisdictions have done likewise, treating the statute as merely
restating the existence of common law fiduciary duties without any exten-
sive analysis of the statutory language.' 17 Because, in the corporate and
partnership context, fiduciary duties have been dealt with essentially by
case law, there would not seem to be a compelling need to have a statutory
approach to fiduciary duties in the LLC context.
THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT ANALOG
The majority of states have either no statutory duty provision" 8 or
have adopted a version of the provision in the Uniform Partnership
115. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 21 (1914), 6 U.L.A. 608 (1995); 810 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 205/21 (West 1993).
116. See, e.g., Bakalis v. Bressler, 115 N.E.2d 323, 327-28 (I11. 1953); f Couri v. Couri,
447 N.E.2d 334, 337 (II1. 1983).
117. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 549 (N.Y 1928).
118. Arizona, District of Columbia, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, Nevada, and New Jersey See Appendix 2 for citations. Mississippi has a
version of § 8.30 of the Model Business Corporation Act which is basically a duty of care
type provision and does not deal with the duty of loyalty or other fiduciary duties. Arizona,
District of Columbia, Delaware, Kansas, Maryland, Mississippi, and New Jersey have a
provision similar to § 107 of the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (amended 1985),
6A U.L.A. 94 (1995), which provides: "Except as provided in the partnership agreement, a
partner may lend money to and transact other business with the limited partnership and,
subject to other applicable law, has the same rights and obligations with respect thereto as a
person who is not a partner,"
Because a third party has no fiduciary duty in dealing with the entity, arguably such a
provision eliminates fiduciary duties, rather than leaving them to case law. It is highly unlikely
a court would so hold, however. Cf leigler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976), discussed
infra text accompanying notes 200, 206. Moreover, as the comment to § 107 indicates, the
purpose of the above language was not to eliminate fiduciary duties:
Section 107 makes a number of important changes in Section 13 of the prfior unifi-
ltv,. 191.6.Act. Section 13, in effect, created a special fraudulent conveyance provision
applicable to the making of secured loans by limited partners and the repayment by
limited partnerships of loans from limited partners. Section 107 leaves that question to
a Stat a general fraudulent conveyance statute. In addition, Section 107 elimi-
nates the prohibition in former Section 13 against a general partnr (atsoppos, to.
limiedp........ partner's sharing pro rata with general creditors in the case of an
unsecured loan. Of course, other doctrines developed under bankruptcy and insolvency
laws may require the subordination of loans by partners under appropriate circum-
stances.
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Act.'19 Section 21 of the Uniform Act provides simply:
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and
hold as trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent
of the other partners from any transaction connected with the for-
mation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any use
by him of its property' 20
But the problem is that it is too simple. Fortunately, the provision does not
purport to be exclusive. Moreover, possibly because of its curtness, courts
have often ignored its provisions or cited them in passing and relied upon
common law principles.' 12
Section 21 has several ambiguities and limitations, and uses what is
today rather archaic language. For example, it speaks of accounting for
any "benefit" and holding as trustees any "profit" derived without the
consent of the partnership. In today's jargon, this provision seems aimed
at what we call a conflict of interest. But to be wrongful, need the benefit
or profit be "improper?" The Wisconsin statute so qualifies the kind of
benefit that is recoverable by the LLC, 122 but the balance of the LLC
statutes are not so qualified. Thus, these statutes are a throwback to the
turn of the century (to nineteenth, not twentieth century) jurisprudence
where directors of a business were considered trustees and thus transac-
tions with the entity were voidable without rcgard to fairness.123
Today, when a fiduciary deals with the entity, the inquiry is whether the
transaction is fair, not whether the fiduciary made a profit. For example,
if a person bought some property in 1998 for $100,000, became a member
of an LLC in 1999, and sold the property to the LLC in 2000 for
$130,000,124 is there anything improper about the transaction? Clearly the
person made a profit. But the issue today normally would be whether the
price was fair. 125 If the fair market value of the property were $130,000
or more, there would be nothing improper. Even if the property were only
worth $120,000, the "evil" would be $10,000, not $30,000.
Another area where the section 21 approach is deficient is in the entity
opportunity area. The language that the member must "hold as trustee"
any profit or benefit is reminiscent of corporate opportunity language
119. Arkansas, California (by analogy), Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisi-
ana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin. See Appendix 2 for citations.
120. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcTr § 21 (1914), 6 U.L.A. 608 (1995); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 205/21 (1993).
121. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AmT § 21 (1914), 6 U.L.A. 608 (1995); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 205/21 (1993).
122. WIS. STAT. ANN. 183.0402 (West Supp. 1999).
123. Harold MarshJr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus.
LAW. 35 (1966).
124. Assume that the LLC needed this or some similar property for its business.
125. See infia notes 184-88, 197-200, and accompanying text.
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where the remedy is a constructive trust.126 But this obligation to hold as
trustee only arises from a transaction "connected with the formation, con-
duct, or liquidation" of the entity. 127 Such language fits well with the con-
flict of interest situation where, generally, there is a transaction with the
entity. In the entity opportunity situation, however, there is no transaction
with the entity The evil in an entity opportunity situation is that there is
no transaction with the entity, whereas there ought to have been one. In
other words, the fiduciary, for example, buys property for himself whereas
he ought to have acquired it for the entity. In such a situation, he should
hold the property as constructive trustee. It may be that his purchase for
himself is a "transaction connected with the.., conduct" of the LLC, but
this is hardly the language you would use to clearly define the proscribed
conduct. 128
Finally, can the activity of a member, which otherwise would be wrong-
ful, be "righted" by approval of the members? If so, must such approval
be by a mere majority or does it require unanimity? If by a majority, is it
a majority in number or a majority in interest? For example, voting in
some LLCs is per capita, while in others it is per capital.129 Moreover, does
the requisite approval require that those voting be disinterested? 130 Section
21 did not require disinterestedness, nor does North Carolina, 13 1 Okla-
homa,132 Pennsylvania, 133 or Tennessee,134 whereas Arkansas,135 Idaho,1
36
Indiana, 137 Kentucky, 138 Maine, 139 Missouri, 140 Rhode Island,141 and Wis-
consin,' 42 which all specify that the requisite approval be by disinterested
126. UNIF. PARTNrRSHn' ACT § 21 (1914), 6 U.L.A. 608 (1995).
127. Id.
128. See UNIF. LrD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 409(b)(1) (amended 1996), 6A U.L.A. 464 (1995);
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/15-3(b)(1) (West Supp. 2000) ("including the appropriation
of a company's opportunity").
129. Assume voting is per capital. A, B, and C contribute $15,000 each and D, C's brother
(or spouse, or mother, or partner in another venture), contributes $55,000. A and B are
opposed to the LLC buying property from C but D approves. On a per capital basis, the
transaction is approved $70,000 to $30,000. If voting is per capita, a majority of the members
in number of members must approve. A majority of 4 is 3. The transaction could not be
approved by C and D alone. For discussion of per capita and per capital, see infra notes 342-70
and accompanying text.
130. Supra note 115.
131. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-22 (1999).
132. OKLA. STAr. ANN. tit. 18, § 2016 (West 1999).
133. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8943, 1715(d)-(g), 1712 (West 1998).
134. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-240-120 (1995).
135. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-402 (Michie 1996).
136. IDAHO CODE § 53-622 (1994).
137. IND. CODE: ANN. § 23-18-4-2 (Michie 1999).
138. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 275.170 (Banks-Baldwin 1999).
139. Mi.. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 652 (West 1964 & Supp. 1999).
140. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.088 (West Supp. 2001).
141. R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-16-17 (1999).
142. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 183.0402 (West Supp. 1999).
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members or managers. Using a different approach, North Carolina and
Oklahoma require that the consent be "informed."1
43
These are all issues that a properly drafted fiduciary duty statute should
address. Although it deals only with conflict of interest, the Illinois cor-
porate statute 144 is a good model in clarifying that fairness is the key, that
approvals must be disinterested, that those approving must be fully in-
formed, and that such approvals only change the burden of proof, rather
than creating a safe harbor. While some may argue for the safe harbor
approach, this generally is not the approach in the corporate world. More-
over, anyone involved with litigation in the fiduciary duty area knows that
the name of the game is who has the burden of proof
SIMPLIFIED STATUTORYAPPROA CHES
TO FIDUCIARYDUTY
If the LLC statute is to address fiduciary duties, one approach is, in
effect, to incorporate by reference. For example, the California statute
provides that "[t] he fiduciary duties a manager owes to the limited liability
company and to its members are those of a partner to a partnership and
to the partners of the partnership."' 145 Because the initial approach to the
creation of LLCs was to create an incorporated partnership, a sensible
approach with respect to fiduciary duties was simply to incorporate the
fiduciary duty law of partnership into the LLC law.
A different approach to incorporation by reference was adopted by Il-
linois. When the Illinois legislature first enacted an LLC Act in 1992, it
included a section which provided that the duties of members shall be
analogous to those of shareholders in the corporate context and the duties
of managers shall be analogous to those of directors. 146 This provision
disturbed some transaction lawyers in the large Chicago law firms, because
they feared that it would incorporate the doctrine of piercing the corporate
(entity) veil into LLC law. Accordingly, they began, as a matter of course,
utilizing the Delaware LLC laws, notwithstanding that this then subjected
managers of the Delaware LLC to the jurisdiction of the Delaware
Courts, 147 and notwithstanding ChiefJustice Veasey's characterization of
the Delaware statute as containing provisions that are "prolix, sometimes
oddly organized, and do not always flow evenly."' 148 More significantly,
143. N.C. GEN. STAT § 57C-3-22 (1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2016 (West 1999).
144. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8.60 (West Supp. 2000), set forth in full text in
Appendix 6.
145. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17153 (West Supp. 2000).
146. 1992 Il1. Laws 2529 § 10-10 (repealed).
147. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-109 (1999); see also Assist Stock Management L.L.C.
v. Rosheim, 753 A.2d 974, 978 (Del. Ch. 2000).
148. Elf Atochom North America, Inc. v.Jaffari and Malek LLC, 727 A.2d 286, 291 (Del.
1999), discussed supra text accompanying note 84.
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organizing in Delaware does not eliminate the piercing the entity veil
problem, because such a doctrine is a creditor's remedy, not a fiduciary
duty issue.' 49 Thus, even with respect to a Delaware LLC, Illinois courts
should look to Illinois common law principles in determining whether the
corporate form has been used as an instrument of fraud or injustice. 150
The initial Illinois statute was essentially a limited partnership type ap-
proach, because at the time of its enactment, it was necessary that an LLC
have more partnership characteristics than corporate characteristics in or-
der to be taxed as a partnership.151 When the "check-the- box" regulations
were adopted, 152 however, Illinois reappraised its existing statutory provi-
sions. Subsequent to the initial Illinois enactment of LLC legislation, the
ULLCA was promulgated by the Uniform Commissioners, and in the
interest of uniformity, there was substantial interest in adopting ULLCA
in its entirety to replace the old Illinois statute. Many of ULLCA's provi-
sions were prudent and were ultimately adopted. There was considerable
difference of opinion, however, as to whether the ULLCA approach to
fiduciary duty should be adopted in Illinois. Ultimately, the ULLCA pro-
visions on fiduciary duties were substantially modified. In order to appre-
ciate the present Illinois statutory provisions regarding fiduciary duties,
first it is necessary to review the ULLCA approach.
THE FLA WED APPROACH OF THE UNIFORM A CT
It is surprising that a Model Act adopted by the Uniform Commission-
ers could be both so poorly drafted and embody such poor public policy.
The structure of ULLCA 5 3 is to set forth that "[t]he only fiduciary duties
a member owes to a member-managed company and its other members
are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care imposed by subsections (b) and
149. See Abu-Nassar v. Elders Futures, Inc., No. 88CIV.7906, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3794, *14-*15 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1991), summary judgement granted in part, denied in part,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11470 (SD.N.Y Aug. 17, 1994) (stating "[a]s a general matter, the
law of the state of incorporation normally determines issues relating to the internal affairs of
a corporation .... Different conflicts principles, however, apply where the rights of third
parties external to the corporation are at issue.") (citing First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para
el Comercio Exterio, 462 U.S. 611, 621 (1983)); cf Tom Thumb Food Markets, Inc. v. TLH
Properties, LLC, No. C9-98-1277, 1999 WL 31168, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 1999)
(quoting Roepke v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 302 N.W.2d. 350, 352 (Minn. 1981)).
150. For an extensive discussion of the Illinois cases on piercing the corporate veil, see
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 114, §§ 8.11-8.23.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 5-8. See also infra text accompanying notes 262-63.
152. 61 Fed. Reg. 66,584 (1996) (to be codified at 26 CER. pts. 1, 301, 602) (corrected
at 62 Fed. Reg. 11,769 (1997)).
153. See UNfr. LTD. LIAB. Co. AcT § 409 (amended 1996), 6A U.L.A. 464-65 (1995),
general standards of members and managers conduct, which is set forth in full text in Ap-
pendix 3.
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(c)." 1 54 Thus, ULLCA provides the exclusive list of fiduciary duties when
a business is organized as an LLC.
There are several problems with this approach. First of all, the duty of
loyalty and the duty of care are duties owed by fiduciaries to the entity. In
their traditional form, they do not cover obligations owed by the members
to each other. Yet ULLCA says that the only fiduciary duties a member
owes to other members are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. Because
these duties are owed to the entity and not to members, arguably there
are no duties that one member owes directly to another under ULLCA.
This approach flies in the face of developments in corporate law over
the last two and a half decades which recognize that shareholders (mem-
bers) in a corporation do owe fiduciary duties to each other akin to those
owed by partners in a partnership.155 This fiduciary obligation in the cor-
porate context between shareholders is referred to as a duty of good faith
and fair dealing. ULLCA does provide that "[a] member shall discharge
the duties to a member-managed company and its other members under
this [Act] or under the operating agreement and exercise any rights con-
sistently with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing.'" 5 6 This pro-
vision does not mean, however, that there is a fiduciary obligation of good
faith and fair dealing between members, even though that is what the fore-
going provision would seem to say, because this provision is in paragraph
(d), whereas paragraph (a) states that the only fiduciary duties are found in
paragraphs (b) and (c). Unfortunately, the Uniform Commissioners have
taken the position that the obligation of good faith and fair dealing in
ULLCA is not a fiduciary duty standard but rather a commercial standard.
The differences between a commercial standard and a fiduciary duty
standard are substantial. In a fiduciary duty context, the persons in control,
who are trying to uphold the actions they are taking, have the burden of
proof to establish that such actions were taken in good faith and were fair
to the minority members. 157 Usually they will be the defendants and thus,
in contrast to the normal situation where the plaintiff has the burden of
proof, the defendants will have the burden of proof On the other hand,
under the commercial standard, the plaintiff would have the burden of
proving that the other person did not act in good faith. Moreover, good
faith in the commercial context is a very minimalist standard. 151
154. Id. § 409(a), 6A U.L.A. 464 (1995) (emphasis added).
155. See Effective Remedies, supra note 114, at 433-36.
156. UNIF. LTo. LIAB. Co. AcT § 409(d) (amended 1996), 6A U.L.A. 464 (1995) (citing
Hill v. Erwin Mills, Inc., 80 S.E.2d 358, 363 (N.C. 1954)).
157. See, e.g., Loy v. Lorm Corp., 278 S.E.2d 897, 901 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (citing Hill,
80 S.E.2d at 363).
158. In Froelich v. Erickson, 96 E Supp. 2d 507, 522 (D. Md. 2000), the court interpreted
the good faith and fair dealing commercial standard as follows:
Assuming arguendo that Maryland does recognize a separate cause of action, the duty of
good faith and fair dealing is so narrow that it does not apply here. Explaining the duty
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Questions may be raised as to which approach, commercial or fiduciary,
is more appropriate with respect to relations among members in a limited
liability company. In order to resolve this issue, it is necessary to understand
the basic nature of a commercial transaction and contrast it with the basic
nature of relations among members in a limited liability company. In the
classical commercial context, there is: (i) a transaction (ii) between legal
strangers (iii) which involves closure. On the other hand, in a business
organization there is: (i) a relationship (ii) between legal associates
(iii) which is an open, i.e., ongoing, situation. While it is true that some
commercial transactions are ongoing and involve longstanding business
relationships, nevertheless it is understood in commercial transactions that
persons are dealing at arm's length with each other, and that each party
to the transaction has interests that are in opposition to those of the other
party. For example, the seller wants the highest price with the least war-
ranty exposure, whereas the buyer wants the lowest price with the greatest
warranty protection. On the other hand, in a business organization, the
members have an aligned interest in which they expect to work together
over time for their mutual benefit.
The approach of the contractarians to this issue is that, if the parties
want the protections afforded by a fiduciary relationship, let them contract
for it. 159 This is unrealistic for several reasons. First of all, there is the
matter of cost. Most businesses, at inception, have a financing problem.
The most efficient employment of the available finances is for the capital
and operating needs of the business, not for attorney's fees. The popularity
of books such as, How to Form Your Own Corporation Without a Lawyerfor Under
$75,160 demonstrates that business people are not eager to expend any
more monies on attorney's fees than is absolutely necessary.
In order to draft an adequate shareholders' agreement in the corporate
context, or operating agreement in the LLC context, which would provide
the types of protection that fiduciary duties provide on a default basis, one
in the context of a loan agreement, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals stated that,
"the duty of good faith merely obligates a lender to exercise good faith in performing
its contractual obligations; it does not obligate a lender to take affirmative actions that
the lender is clearly not required to take under its loan documents."
See Parker v. Columbia Bank, 604 A.2d 521 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992), cert. denied, 610 A.2d
796 (Md. 1992). The court emphasized that the duty of good faith and fair dealing "simply
prohibits one party to a contract from acting in such a manner as to prevent the other party
from performing his obligations under the contract," Id. See also Enfield Equipment Co. v.
John Deere Co., 64 E Supp. 2d 483 (D. Md. 1999); Dupont Heights Ltd. Partnership v.
Riggs Nat'l Bank, 949 F Supp. 383 (D. Md. 1996).
159. Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the
Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 28 (1990) (dealing with corporations). Much of Butler
and Ribstein's thinking is based upon market discipline and there is no market for closely
held interests, whether corporate or LLC.
160. TED NICHOLAS & SEAN P. MELVIN, How To FORM YOUR OWN CORPORATION
WITHOUT A LAWYER FOR UNDER $75 (28th ed. 1999).
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could expect an attorney's fee in the range of $10,000 or more, at least in
the Chicagoland area. One of the reasons for this high cost is the difficulty
in drafting such an agreement. Because we are dealing with a relationship,
we need to anticipate problems that may not arise until years down the
line. If one were to examine the litigated cases, one would find that many
of the cases involve problems that have arisen a decade or more after the
organization of the business.1 61 This is because, over time, situations
change. Personality differences may arise, someone may go through an
ego shattering divorce, a spoiled child may enter the business, or the fi-
nancial misfortunes of one member may lead him or her to make demands
that are unacceptable to other members.
In discussing the duty of good faith under ULLCA, the comment to
ULLCA states that "a members' refusal to vote for an interim distribution
because of negative tax implications to that member does not violate that
member's obligation of good faith to the other members."1 62 In point of
fact, the refusal by those in control to make distributions in order to enable
other members to pay the taxes on the income they constructively receive
in a pass-through entity, such as a sub-chapter S corporation, a limited
partnership, or an LLC is generally viewed as a breach of fiduciary duty
by those in control. 163
The Labovitz case is particularly instructive. There, the limited partner-
ship agreement gave unfettered discretion to the general partner to deter-
mine when and if distributions were to be made. Notwithstanding this
broad grant of authority to the general partner, the Illinois appellate court
held that it was a breach of his fiduciary duty to withhold distributions to
create cash flow problems for the limited partners. 164 Because a limited
partnership is a pass-through entity for tax purposes, the limited partners
were taxed on the income generated by the limited partnership. When the
general partner refused to make cash distributions, the limited partners
were faced with a cash outflow, namely, the payment of their tax liability,
but received no cash from the business to enable them to pay their taxes.
This then gave the general partner leverage, because the limited partners
had a negative cash flow instead of a positive cash flow, thereby decreasing
the attractiveness of their investment and inducing the limited partners to
sell to the general at a cheaper price.
161. See, e.g., Battaglia v. Battaglia, 596 N.E.2d 712, 719 (111. App. Ct. 1992), appeal denied
602 N.E.2d 446 (111. 1992) (involving brothers that had worked together for 40 years); In re
Kemp & Beatley, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1176 (N.Y 1984) (involving plaintiffs that had worked
for the business for 35 and 42 years, respectively); Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798, 803
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (involving a plaintiff that had been employed for 45 years and the
defendant brothers employed for 34 and 50 years respectively).
162. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 409 (amended 1996), 6A U.L.A. 465 (1995), Comment.
163. See Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304, 311 (111. App. Ct. 1989), appeal denied, 550
N.E.2d 557 (111. 1990); see also Tifft v. Stevens, 978 P.2d 1, 10 (Or. Ct. App. 1999), review
denied, 6 R3d 1101 (Or. 2000).
164. See Labovitz, 545 N.E.2d at 313.
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The issue of fiduciary duties have been framed by contractarians as
embodying a choice between a statutory approach which is paternalistic
and one which is contractual. By way of illustration, if a paternalistic ap-
proach is chosen, the default provision in the statute would be to provide
for the broad and general existence of fiduciary duties and then, if nec-
essary, let the parties contract to limit such duties. On the other hand, in
a contractarian approach, the statutes would be silent or would have lim-
ited fiduciary duties and would permit the parties, if they chose, by contract
to impose additional obligations upon themselves.
Thus, we have two approaches to drafting a statute, one paternalistic,
seeking to protect people by leaving fiduciary duties as the default provision
in the statute, and the other contractarian, which leaves people free to fend
for themselves and create whatever protections they need. To sharpen the
issue as to which approach is more appropriate, it is also well to postulate,
as caricature, that there are two types of business arrangements as well.
One situation would envision sophisticated people engaging in a significant
transaction in which substantial funds are involved, including the funds to
obtain sophisticated advice. In the other situation, postulate that the in-
vestors are less sophisticated, funds in general are limited, and sophisti-
cated advice is less available, not only because of cost but also the nature
of legal practice in the area. 165
What type of business situation is the most prevalent? To put the issue
in perspective, according to the records of the Secretary of State of Illinois,
there are about 200,000 corporations in Illinois of which about 170,000
have capital of $25,000 or less. 166 Although the amount of money invested
in a business does not necessarily say anything about the sophistication of
the business owners, it is a fair assumption to conclude that few businesses
with capital of less than $25,000 would be eager to pay substantial
amounts, in the nature of $10,000 or more, for organizational expenses
which would include the drafting of sophisticated and detailed agreements.
There does not appear to be any data on the extent to which business
owners are sophisticated with respect to legal matters, such as fiduciary
obligations. From the generally recognized antipathy of the business world
toward lawyers, however, it can be assumed that there is not general ap-
preciation among the public for the advice that lawyers proffer.16 7
165. Transactions involving millions of dollars are often negotiated by sophisticated law-
yers specializing in business transactions who are members of national law firms. On the
other hand, the lawyers for a modest transaction in a small town might do divorce, estate
planning, and local government law besides business transactions, because the demographics
do not permit her to specialize and still earn a living.
166. Illinois Secretary of State, Domestic Total Capital Ranges (Apr. 26, 1988) (on file
with author).
167. In giving talks to bar associations over the years, I have surveyed business lawyers as
to how much time they spend in discussing fiduciary obligations with their clients upon the
organization of a business. Many report that this is a subject that is not discussed at all and
the median time spent would appear to be in the order of ten to fifteen minutes.
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As stated earlier, when organizing a business, most businesspeople
perceive the most pressing need for the use of funds to be in procuring
capital equipment and otherwise providing for operations. Legal fees are
not a top priority Moreover, when entering the business relationship, most
businessmen enter the relationship the same as most of us enter the marital
relationship: optimistically and ill-prepared. Optimism about the future
prospects of the business is not a catalyst to enter into an extensive and ex-
pensive contract dealing with all the misfortunes that might occur later on.
What then would seem to be good public policy? Because most busi-
nesses are small upon inception, and because, arguably, most businesspeo-
ple are not sophisticated about fiduciary relationships, the default provision
of a statute should provide for the full range of fiduciary obligations.
The counter argument is that there are many situations in which tra-
ditional fiduciary duties ought to be limited. A typical situation is one in
which two independent real estate investors combine to form a new project
as a joint venture. After the project is completed, they want to be free to
continue their own real estate ventures and to develop other projects in-
dependent of each other.
The leading case of Meinhard v. Salmon,168 however, held that two partners
in a real estate venture owed each other the fiduciary duty to give each
other the opportunity to participate in future ventures. Such fiduciary duty
would be inconsistent with the goals of the two real estate developers set
forth above and, if not modified, might dissuade them from entering into
the joint venture. This, however, is a classic illustration of sophisticated
businesspeople dealing with a substantial project in which significant
funds will be expended for sophisticated advice, namely, the creation of
the joint venture agreement and numerous other contractual and financial
documents. Accordingly, these people are well able to fend for themselves
and, through contract, could limit what would otherwise be the fiduciary
duty not to compete with each other or to afford each other future
opportunities. 169
Thus, a statute which provides for fiduciary duties as a default provision
thereby protects smaller or unsophisticated businessmen, but can also pro-
vide latitude for sophisticated investors to determine by contract the nature
of their relationship.
A statute like ULLCA, which purports to define and then limit fiduciary
duties, is flawed in another respect. As stated above, the statute purports
to limit the fiduciary duties that a member owes-either to the organi-
168. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546-47 (N.Y 1928).
169. The common law recognizes the right of businessmen in appropriate situations to
limit the circumstances in which they have ongoing fiduciary duties to each other. See, e.g,
Dremco, Inc. v. South Chapel Hill Gardens, Inc., 654 N.E.2d 501, 505 (IIl. App. Ct. 1995)
(citing Carroll v. Caldwell, 147 N.E.2d 69, 74 (111. 1958), appeal denied, 660 N.E.2d 1267 (11.
1995)).
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zation or other members-to the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. The
statute then further limits the duty of loyalty to entity opportunity, conflict
of interest, and refraining from competing with the entity.'
70
But does this exhaust the scope of fiduciary duties? The conflict of in-
terest provision is phrased in terms of refraining from dealing with the
company. But failure to deal with the entity can itself be a breach of fi-
duciary duty. For example, assume two persons, comprising all of the of-
ficers and directors of the entity, were conducting a moving and storage
business in a warehouse leased from one of them. Further assume that the
entity had an option to extend the lease or to purchase the property and
that there was no other suitable storage site. In such a situation, 171 failure
to renew the lease or exercise the option to purchase the real estate would
mean that the corporation would be out of business and its value would
be destroyed. In such a circumstance, action by the shareholder who
owned the real estate-either in her capacity as director or as shareholder-
to frustrate the exercise of the option or the renewal of the lease would be
a breach of fiduciary duty-even though all the shareholder who owns the
property need do is simply take no action. By taking no action, the cor-
poration cannot act because, with two shareholders and two directors, it
is impossible to get a majority vote if one person opposes the transaction
or simply does not act. A majority of two is two. Yet what such shareholder
was doing, namely nothing, meets the standard of ULLCA, namely that
she is fulfilling her obligation to refrain from dealing with the company.
Another problem in seeking to limit fiduciary duties to those enumer-
ated is that it fails to take into account that fiduciaries have a duty of
disclosure and candor to each other. The Delaware supreme court,'7 2 as
well as the Illinois courts 173 and courts in other jurisdictions, 174 have rec-
ognized that there is a duty of disclosure and complete candor when a
fiduciary deals with those to whom he/she or it owes a fiduciary duty.
While, at first blush, the provisions of ULLCA would seem to incorporate
this duty,175 the obligation to furnish information under ULLCA only
applies where "reasonably required for the proper exercise of the mem-
ber's rights and performance of the member's duties under the operating
agreement or this [Act]."' 76 If someone were to negotiate for the purchase
170. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 409 (amended 1996), 6A U.L.A. § 464 (1995).
171. See, e.g, Application of Vogel, 268 N.YS.2d 237, 240 (N.Y App. Div. 1966), aff'd,
278 N.YS.2d 236 (N.Y. 1967).
172. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 279 (Del. 1977) (quoting Lynch v.
Vickers Energy Corp., 351 A.2d 570, 573 (Del. Ch. 1976)).
173. See BUSINFSS ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 114, § 14.06.
174. Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 E2d 3, 8 (1st Cir. 1986); Glidden Co. v.Jandornoa,
173 ER.D. 459, 478 (W.D. Mich. 1997); Squaw Mountain Cattle v. Bowen, 804 P.2d 1292,
1297 (Wyo. 1991).
175. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. AcTr § 409 (amended 1996), 6A U.L.A. 464 (1995).
176. Id. § 4.08(b)(1), 6A U.L.A. 463 (1995).
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of another member's interest, however, the member, in selling his or her
interest would not be exercising her rights or performing her duties under
the operating agreement or the statute. Therefore, the informational pro-
visions of ULLCA would not be applicable and, under section 409, there
would not be a fiduciary duty between the members. In the corporate
context, where one fifty percent shareholder negotiated to sell both his and
the other shareholder's shares, and in the process obtained a better deal
for himself, the court stated that defendant "stood in a fiduciary relation
to Leeb [the other shareholder] ... that he failed to deal openly and
honestly with Leeb, and that, in fact, his conduct was fraudulent."' 77
The ULLCA provisions are flawed for a variety of other reasons: (i) they
are poorly drafted and internally inconsistent; (ii) they either dramatically
change existing law or fail to accomplish what their proponents sought;
and (iii) as an attempt to restate some parts of existing law, they are back
in the nineteenth century
Section 409(b)(2) provides that the duty of loyalty requires a member:
"to refrain from dealing with the company in the conduct or winding up
of the company's business as or on behalf of a party having an interest
adverse to the company." 78 This is certainly not the duty of loyalty today!
It may have been in the nineteenth century Today, the law generally is
that a fiduciary may deal with the entity as an adverse party, that is on
opposite sides-the conflict of interest situation-so long as the transaction
is fair. For example, in Winger v. Chicago Citibank,179 the Illinois supreme
court stated that "directors of a corporation cannot purchase from them-
selves." This language in the Winger decision, however, was rejected by the
Illinois supreme court in Shlensky v. South Parkway Building Corp.180 In this
later case, the court held that a transaction between a corporation and a
director is not presumptively void, but is valid if fair. Unless there is dis-
interested approval, the proponent of the transaction, the director, has the
burden of proof
This is the same philosophy that is embodied in the Illinois Business
Corporation Act.' 18 The act provides that a director can deal with a cor-
poration, or, in other words, be on both sides of the transaction, so long
as the transaction is fair. Again, the burden is on the director unless there
is either a disinterested shareholder or disinterested director approval. It
is also the same approach that is embodied in section 144 of the Delaware
Act, 182 as interpreted by the Delaware supreme court in Fliegler v. Law-
177. Illinois Rockford Corp. v. Kulp, 242 N.E.2d 228, 233 (Il1. 1968).
178. UNIF. LTD. LiAB. Co. ACT § 409(b)(2) (amended 1996), 6A U.L.A. 464 (1995).
179. Winger v. Chicago City Bank & Trust Co., 67 N.E.2d 265, 276 (111. 1946).
180. Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Co., 166 N.E.2d 793, 800 (Il. 1960) (explaining
the Winger decision).
181. 805 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8.60 (West Supp. 2000).
182. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-144 (1991 & Supp. 1998).
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rence,183 where the court, in effect, rewrote the Delaware statute, holding
that it is not a safe harbor, but merely changes the burden of proof and
that the fiduciary will have the burden of proof unless there is disinterested
shareholder approval.
Consequently, a provision prohibiting a member from dealing with the
LLC as an adverse party is archaic and is certainly not a restatement of
existing law.
The ULLCA provisions are also internally inconsistent. Notwithstand-
ing the seemingly absolute prohibition from dealing with a company in
section 409(b)(2) of ULLCA, another section provides that "[a] member
of a member-managed company does not violate a duty or obligation
under this [Act] or under the operating agreement merely because the
member's conduct furthers the member's own interest." 184 The implica-
tion of this section, were it to be considered in isolation, is that a member
could deal "adversely" with the LLC. In other words, furthering the mem-
ber's own interests does not violate a duty to the LLC.
If the two provisions are to be reconciled, the keyword is "merely" For
example, if the member sells property to the LLC and thereby generates
cash for the member, this is arguably furthering the member's own interest.
But, if the transaction is fair to the entity, there would be no breach under
existing law. None of these ULLCA provisions refer to fairness, however.
If fairness is the issue, then ULLCA should so state. Instead, ULLCA
creates a potential inconsistency.
The morass becomes all the more complicated when one looks at an-
other section of ULLCA which provides:
A member of a member-managed company may lend money to and
transact other business with the company. As to each loan or trans-
action, the rights and obligations of the member are the same as those
of a person who is not a member, subject to other applicable law. 185
How can this provision be squared with the provision requiring a mem-
ber to refrain from dealing with the LLC? It would seem that the first
sentence of the above language is in direct conflict with the provision which
precludes members from dealing with the LLC as an adverse party. Lend-
ing money and transacting other business with the company is "dealing
with the company."
Not only are these provisions confusing and inconsistent, but if they
mean what they say, the provisions dramatically change existing law. The
second sentence, quoted above, provides that, with respect to each trans-
action, the rights of a member are the same as those of a person who is
not a member. This is in direct conflict with fiduciary duty law in general.
183. Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976).
184. UNIF. LTi). LIAB. Co. ACT § 409(e) (amended 1996), 6A U.L.A. 464 (1995).
185. Id. § 409(f), 6A U.L.A. 464 (1995) (emphasis added).
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A fiduciary has different obligations than a third party. A third party has
no obligation to charge a fair price to the LLC. The third party generally
can charge any price she can induce the LLC to pay. When a third party
deals with the entity, and the entity sues the third party, the plaintiff entity
has the burden of proof. When a fiduciary deals with an entity, however,
the defendant fiduciary has the burden of proving that the transaction is
fair. 1 86 Thus, the provision in ULLCA that, when dealing with the LLC,
the member has the same obligations as a third party is inconsistent with
existing law.
Although it could be argued that this third-party provision was designed
to overrule existing law, the picture is further clouded by the very last
phrase-that the rights of the member are the same as third parties "sub-
ject to other applicable law."1 87 If this last phrase preserves existing law,
then it negates the entire provision. It is unparalleled that a piece of pro-
posed legislation could be so confusing and inconsistent.
THE ILLINOIS MODIFICATIONS TO ULLCA
The fiduciary duty provisions of the present Illinois Act' 88 modify
ULLCA in several important respects. The initial provision makes it clear
that the enumerated duties are non-exclusive and that there is, thus, room
for case law development. This provision provides simply that the "fidu-
ciary duties a member owes ... include the duty of loyalty and the duty of
care .... 189 Accordingly, under the Illinois Act, the duty of good faith
and fair dealing'9 0 is a fiduciary duty, not a commercial standard. ULLCA,
on the other hand, states that the duty of care and the duty of loyalty are
the only fiduciary duties a member has. 19 1 In addition, in enumerating
certain categories of the duty of loyalty, the Illinois provision similarly
provides that the duty of loyalty "includes" the enumerated provisions. 192
Thus, the duty of loyalty provisions that are enumerated are non-exclusive.
By way of contrast, ULLCA provides that the duty of loyalty is limited to
the enumerated duties.193
Equally important is the fact that the provision of ULLCA, which pro-
vided that a member's responsibilities in dealing with the company are the
same as a third party,194 has been dropped in its entirety. The ULLCA
provision dealing with conflict of interest' 95 has been completely rewritten.
186. See Loy v. Lorm Corp., 278 S.E.2d 897, 901 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981).
187. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 409(f) (amended 1996), 6A U.L.A. 464 (1995).
188. 805 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 180/15-3 (West Supp. 2000). See Appendix 2.
189. Id. 180/15-3(a) (emphasis added).
190. Id. 180/15-3(d).
191. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 409(a), 6A U.L.A. 464 (1995).
192. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/15-3(b) (West 2000).
193. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 409(b), 6A U.L.A. 464 (1995).
194. Id. §409(f).
195. Id.
HeinOnline  -- 56 Bus. Law.  535 2000-2001
536 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 56, February 2001
Rather than providing that members must refrain from dealing with the
LLC, the Illinois provision restates existing law by requiring the member
"to act fairly when a member deals with the company in the conduct or
winding up of the company's business as or on behalf of a party having
an interest adverse to the company."' 196 Thus, the conflict of interest pro-
vision is consistent with case law around the country.197 It is also consistent
with other entity statutes, such as section 8.60 of the Illinois Business Cor-
poration Act' 98 and section 144 of the Delaware General Corporation
Law, 199 as modified by Fleigler v. Lawrence,200 by making fairness the touch-
stone as to whether a transaction involving a conflict of interest can stand.
In general, the Illinois fiduciary duty provisions stand as a sound model
if the subject of fiduciary duties are to be dealt with, at least in part, by
statute, rather than being left entirely to common law development. The
primary weakness of the Illinois LLC statute is that it follows Delaware's
approach in dealing with ratification. 20 ' It states that the operating agree-
ment may "specify the number or percentage of members or disinterested
managers that may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure of all material
facts, a specific act or transaction that otherwise would violate these du-
ties." '202 ULLCA has a provision that is substantially identical. 20 3 Thus,
although the statute specifies that only disinterested managers may authorize
or ratify a transaction, it is open to the interpretation that interested members
could so act. 204 It is extremely unlikely, however, that a court would permit
an interested member to insulate himself from responsibility in a conflict
of interest situation.
As stated above, this provision is patterned after section 144 of the Dela-
ware General Corporation law.2 05 The Delaware supreme court, however,
interpreting section 144 in Fliegler v. Lawrence,20 6 held first that it does not
constitute a "safe harbor" but rather merely changes the burden of proof,
196. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/15-3(b)(2) (West 2000).
197. See, e.g., United Founders Life Ins. Co. v. Consumers Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 447 E2d
647, 652-53 (7th Cir. 1971); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); Guis
Sports Enters., Inc. v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., 496 N.E.2d 959, 965-67, 969-70 (Ohio
1986).
198. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT, ANN. 5/8.60 (West 2000) (reflecting the policy articulated
in Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 166 N.E.2d 793, 801 (Ill. 1960)).
199. DEL. Coin ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1998).
200. 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976).
201. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1998).
202. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/15-5(b)(6)(B) (West 2000) (emphasis added).
203. UNIF. LTD. LIAi. Co. ACT § 103(b)(2)(ii) (amended 1996), 6A U.L.A. 62 (Supp.
1999).
204. Statutes in other states require disinterested member approval. See supra notes 135-
42 and accompanying text.
205. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1998). See also Appendix 5.
206. 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976).
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and in order to effectuate such change in the burden of proof, the vote of
the shareholders must be a disinterested vote of the shareholders. 20
7
In Illinois, section 8.60 of the Business Corporation Act was drafted
after section 144 was, in effect, modified by the court in Fliegler v. Law-
rence.208 Section 8.60 begins by providing that the person seeking to uphold
the transaction, namely the fiduciary, has the burden of proof and that this
burden is changed to plaintiff only when there is either disinterested di-
rector or disinterested shareholder approval. 209 In view of the decision of the
Illinois supreme court in Shlensky v. South Parkway Building Corp.,2 10 and the
heightened scrutiny which Illinois courts give transactions involving fidu-
ciaries, the present provision in the Illinois LLC Act could well be inter-
preted (as did the Delaware supreme court in Fliegler) as requiring not only
disinterested manager approval but also disinterested shareholder approval
and holding that such approval, rather than insulating the transaction from
judicial review, merely changes the burden of proof.
The logic of section 8.60, and the deficiency in ULLCA and present
Illinois provisions, can be illustrated by the following example. Assume a
limited liability company has three members, Able, Baker, and Carol. Nor-
mally, when the limited liability company engages in a transaction with a
third party, the interests of Able, Baker, and Carol will be aligned. They
all want to get the best possible deal for the limited liability company and
would negotiate vigorously with a third party to accomplish such an ad-
vantageous transaction. What if Able and Baker decide, however, to sell
an asset which they hold personally to the limited liability company at an
inflated price. Because Able and Baker are a majority of the members,
they could authorize the transaction from the standpoint of authorization.
But should the transaction be insulated from judicial scrutiny, simply be-
cause they approve or ratify the transaction?
It can be seen that, in this context, the interests of Able and Baker are
aligned but are antithetical to the interest of Carol and the interest of the
LLC itself. The contrary argument that is sometimes made is that it is still
in the best interest of Able and Baker to benefit the LLC, because they
hold a 67% interest in the LLC. To the extent that the price they are
charging the LLC for the asset is overstated, however, as members of the
limited liability company they bear 67% of such unfairness in price, but
they reap 100% of the benefit of the unfairness in their individual capac-
ities. In effect, there is a transfer of value from Carol to Able and Baker.
Take a concrete example. Assume that Able and Baker own real estate
worth $200,000, which they propose to transfer to the LLC for $300,000.
The LLC, by paying $300,000 for a $200,000 asset, has lost $100,000 in
207. See id. at 222.
208. See 805 ILL. COMP. SrAr. ANN. 5/8.60 (West 2000).
209. See id. See also Appendix 6.
210. 166 N.E.2d 793 (Ill. 1960).
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value, but that $100,000 loss is born equally by Able, Baker, and Carol.
Able and Baker in their individual capacities, however, are up $100,000
or $50,000 each. Thus, the net effect of the transaction is that Carol is out
$33,333, while Able and Baker have gained $16,667 each. To permit Able
and Baker to approve their own self dealing is inconsistent with the basic
concept of fiduciary duty.
CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS OF FIDUCIAR.YDUTY
As stated earlier, it is surprising that there has not been more litigation
in the 1990s involving fiduciary duties. The litigation thus far illustrates,
however, that courts are having some difficulty in dealing with fiduciary
issues in the context of LLCs. One issue which is also troublesome to some
courts in the corporate area, is distinguishing whether a fact pattern im-
plicates the duty of care or the duty of loyalty. In fact, this should be a
simple matter to resolve. For the duty of care, and the business judgment
rule, to be applicable, there must be no conflicting interest.2 1
The difficulty that courts have in determining whether a factual situa-
tion implicates the duty of care-with the attendant protection of the
business judgment rule-or the duty of loyalty (or related fiduciary duties
where the transaction is tainted by self-interest) is illustrated by Froelich v.
Erickson.2 12 Froelich, and other employees of a business that Erickson had
started, used an LLC as a vehicle to buy the company in a leveraged buy-
out. Erickson was not paid up front but received $150 million in preferred
interests paying nine percent. The liquidity of the LLC quickly deterio-
rated and it failed to make its payments to Erickson. The LLC board of
directors removed Froelich as CEO and replaced him with Erickson. Er-
ickson also, on two occasions, extended personal guarantees to facilitate
financing the LLC's projects.
When additional financing required Erickson to provide a $35 million
personal guarantee, Erickson proposed that his preferred interests and the
employee's common interests be reclassified into a single class of common
interests, based upon an independent appraisal of the value of the com-
pany. If the appraisal were equal to or less than the value of Erickson's
interests, he would own virtually 100% of the recapitalized LLC. Erick-
son's proposal was unanimously recommended by the board to the mem-
bers, and all of the sixteen members, except Froelich, approved the pro-
posal. Erickson did not participate in the Board's recommendation and
abstained from voting. The appraisal came in at $155 million, and Erick-
son received more than 99.9% of the interests. The members then ap-
proved a cash-out merger so that Erickson became the only surviving
member.
211. See A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c)(1) (1994).
212. 96 E Supp. 2d 507 (D. Md. 2000).
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Froelich filed suit under various theories, including breach of fiduciary
duty. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Erickson on the
basis that "the Board's decisions are protected by the business judgment
rule." 2 13 Although this would be an appropriate basis upon which to enter
summary judgment for a defendant who was an independent director, the
independent directors were not sued.214 Erickson, on the other hand, had
a conflict of interest as a director of the LLC because he was on both sides
of the transaction. 2 15 He was a director of the LLC, and he was dealing
with the LLC by exchanging preferred interests for common ones.
The court did state that "Erickson, as a majority interest holder, owed
a fiduciary duty to the minority interest holders. In addition, as a director
of [the LLC], Erickson owed a fiduciary duty to the Members. '2 16 Based
upon the facts of the case, the court concluded that "no reasonable jury
could conclude that Erickson breached these duties." 2 17 The court should
have stopped there.
Unfortunately, the court went on to state that Froelich's breach of fi-
duciary theory "fails under the business judgment rule.' 2 18 As stated
above, however, for the business judgment rule to come into play there
must be no conflict of interest. 219 Because Erickson did have a conflict of
interest, he normally would have the burden of proof. But if there were
either disinterested director approval or disinterested shareholder (mem-
ber) approval-and in this case there were both-the burden of proof
would shift back to the plaintiff to show fairness. 220 In view of the disin-
terested approvals and the lack of evidence that the Erickson proposal was
unfair, summary judgment was appropriate. But, for the court to analyze
this case under the business judgment role only obfuscates the distinction
between the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.
213. Id. at 526.
214. The original board was composed of seven directors, including Erickson and Froelich.
Of the other five, three were brought to the Board by Froelich, All were members of the
LLC as well. After Froelich was removed as CEO, two-thirds ofthe members voted to remove
him from the board of directors.
215. Froelich phrased the breach of fiduciary duty issue as "usurp[ing] a corporate op-
portunity" whereas it should have been phrased in terms of a self-dealing conflict of interest.
96 E Supp. 2d at 526.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCF; § 4.01(c)(1) (1993).
220. Both statutory and case law developments around the country in the last quarter
century have recognized that while the burden of proof is normally on the fiduciary seeking
to uphold a transaction, approval by disinterested directors or disinterested shareholders may
reshift the burden to plaintiff. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8.60(b) (West 2000); Fliegler
v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976). See also supra notes 180-84, 198-200, and accompa-
nying text.
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The court, in Construction and Environmental Management, LLC v. R & R
Handholding, LLC,22' also failed to recognize a duty of loyalty issue,222 this
time because of confusion caused by the multiple entities involved and the
failure to recognize the real party in interest. The case also illustrates how
poorly both the ULLCA fiduciary duty provisions and the Delaware con-
flict of interest provisions are drafted.
Initially, Michael and Darlene Reed jointly owned 100% of R & R, an
LLC organized to acquire and renovate an apartment complex. They
applied to Gulf Coast Commercial Mortgage Company (GCCM) for fi-
nancing. Stephen Bandi was the president and 50% owner of GCCM and,
in June 1995, Bandi recommended that R & R get additional partners for
financial strength. In August, Bandi (40%) and his mother-in-law (60%)
organized Regatta Investment Group LLC (Regatta); Bandi was the man-
aging member of Regatta, and Regatta became a 50% owner in R & R.
Regatta contributed capital equal to that of the Reeds. Thereafter GCCM
obtained $2.3 million of construction financing for R & R.
R & R then engaged Construction and Environmental Management,
LLC (CEM) to act as general contractor. At this time, CEM was owned
by Jerry Conrad and his wife, and Conrad was the managing partner. In
consideration for obtaining this contract, Conrad transferred a 50% in-
terest in CEM to Regatta. Bandi then began functioning as R & R's man-
aging member. At this point, the relationships among the parties looked
like this:
5% 5%5%50% 50% 50
Bank Dendl PIS Recane Regetl RgB? Conrad
In October 1996, Regatta transferred its interest in CEM to Bandi per-
sonally.
The court first addressed the authority issue. Bandi, Mike Reed, and
Conrad negotiated a contract based upon plans and specs that were not
221. 746 So. 2d 817 (La. App. Ct. 1999).
222. The issue of authority, also present in the case, is discussed infra notes 228-29 and
accompanying text.
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very detailed, but no written contract was ever executed. All parties agreed,
however, that the maximum cost would be $2.9 million. Work started in
November, 1995. Soon afterward, the scope of the work changed and the
project went over budget by $300,000 as a result of four oral change orders,
made by Conrad on behalf of CEM and approved by Bandi on behalf of
R & R. Bandi testified that he was the managing member of R & R and
had authority to approve the change orders; however, he acknowledged
that the operating agreement did not give him the authority to act as
manager. Bandi testified that the Reeds were on the job site frequently
and were aware of the changes. On the other hand, the Reeds testified as
follows:
Darlene Reed testified that Bandi was not the managing member of
R & R, and that all decisions required either an oral or written ma-
jority vote of all the members. She stated that Bandi was not author-
ized to approve change orders without the other members. Michael
Reed also testified that all decisions affecting R & R required a ma-
jority vote. He admitted that decisions on the "day-to-day" activities
of the project were left to Bandi.223
The total costs incurred by CEM was $3,129,888, of which R & R paid
$2,852,928. With respect to this excess, R & R contended that (i) change
orders had to be in writing, (ii) if not, then Bandi did not have the authority
to approve them, or (iii) that the excess was due to cost overruns, not
changes to the scope of the work.224 The trial court, after some minor
adjustments, entered judgment against R & R for $263,955 on the basis
that Bandi "had authorization even though he wore many different hats
in this program by representing himself as an owner, representing himself
as a contractor.' 225
The trial court did not appear to deal with the conflict of interest issue
but rather treated the case as being determined on the authority issue.
The trial court did observe, however, that it "painfully render[ed] ...
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, because I just think Mr. Bandi really
duped everybody. '226
The assignments of error presented to the appellate court included
"[t] he trial court erred in failing to hold that La. R.S. 12:1318C invalidated
Steve Bandi's modifications to the construction contract on behalf of
R & R."227 Section 1318C provides as follows:
No contract or transaction between a limited liability company and
one or more of its members, if management is reserved to the mem-
223. R & R, 746 So. 2d at 820.
224. Id. at 821.
225. Id. at 822.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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bers, or managers, if management is vested in one or more managers
pursuant to R.S. 12:1312, or a person in which such a member or
manager has a financial interest, shall be void or voidable solely for
this reason, solely because the interested member or manager was
present at or participated in the meeting which authorized the con-
tract or transaction, or solely because his or their votes were counted
for such purpose, if the material facts as to his interest and to the con-
tract or transaction was disclosed or known to the members and the
contract or transaction was approved by a majority vote of the mem-
bers without counting the vote of the interested member, or if the con-
tract or transaction was fair to the limited liability company as of the
time it was authorized, approved, or ratified by the members. Inter-
ested members may be counted in determining the presence of a quo-
rum at a meeting which authorized the contract or transaction.2 28
The foregoing Louisiana LLC statute is modeled after the Delaware
corporate conflict of interest statute. 229 The problem with the Delaware
statute, and thus the Louisiana statute, is that it does not say what it means.
It speaks of transaction voidability and repeatedly uses the word "solely."
Thus, the focus is on whether or not the transaction is void, rather than
the fairness of the transaction. 230 Moreover, the verbiage is somewhat ob-
tuse 231 and thus obscures the meaning that should be present in the statute.
This is what happened in Construction and Environmental Management.232
The court, in rejecting plaintilPs argument that section 1318C applied
to the facts at bar, stated:
R & R argues that this article operates to invalidate the change orders
made between R & R and CEM. We find that R. S. 12:1318C is
inapplicable to the instant case. The contract at issue is not between
the corporation, (R & R) and its managing member (Regatta or Mr.
Bandi), nor is the contract at issue between CEM and its managing
member (Regatta or Bandi). Instead the contract sought to be inval-
idated is between R & R and CEM.233
What the court failed to recognize was that the contract was between
R & R and CEM, and it was alleged, in effect, that CEM was overcharging
228. LA. REV. STAT. § 12:1318(c) (West 2000).
229. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1998).
230. As discussed supra, at notes 181-83, 205-07, and accompanying text, however, the
Delaware supreme court has interpreted § 144 as requiring that conflict of interest transac-
tions must be fair to the entity and that the proponent has the burden of proof unless there
is disinterested shareholder or director approval.
231. The Louisiana version of § 8.60 is obtuse when compared with the clarity of the
Illinois version, 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8.60 (West 2000), set forth in full text in
Appendix 6.
232. 746 So. 2d 817 (La. App. Ct. 1999).
233. Id. at 823.
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R & R. Bandi was the representative of R & R in negotiating the contract
with CEM, and Bandi owned 50% of CEM. Thus, Bandi had a clear
conflict of interest. On the one hand, he had an effective 20% interest in
R & R through his 40% interest in Regatta. He also had a financial interest
in CEM, first through his interest in Regatta and later directly when Re-
gatta transferred its 50% in CEM to Bandi.234
If the Louisiana court had understood the Louisiana statute, it would
not have rejected the Reeds' conflict of interest issue. The statute deals
with a transaction between an LLC (R & R) and "a person in which such
a member or manager (Bandi) has a financial interest (CEM).' 235 Unfor-
tunately, the quoted language is so buried in the statute that the court did
not even address it.
"OPTING OUT" OF FIDUCIARYDUTIES
Thus far, the focus has been upon insuring the existence of fiduciary
duties. There are circumstances, however, in which it is appropriate to
enable the members to determine for themselves what activities are ac-
ceptable and do not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty or to establish
standards by which the existence of a duty can be measured. In this regard,
ULLCA and the Illinois Act are not substantially dissimilar. With respect
to the duty of good faith and fair dealing, ULLCA provides that such duty
may not be eliminated, but that the operating agreement "may determine
the standards by which the performance of the obligation is to be mea-
sured, if the standards are not manifestly unreasonable. ' '2 36 The Illinois
provision is substantially identical, but provides that the obligation of good
faith and fair dealing can neither be eliminated nor reduced. 237 The Illinois
Act does, however, recognize that the operating agreement may set forth
standards by which the performance of the obligation is measured, again
if the standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
With respect to the duty of loyalty, both acts provide that such fiduciary
duty may not be eliminated, but that the operating agreement may "iden-
tify specific types or categories of activities that do not violate" these duties,
once again if not manifestly unreasonable. The Illinois Act also provides,
however, that the duties can neither be eliminated nor reduced, but activ-
ities can be identified that do not constitute a breach of a duty. As previ-
ously discussed, 238 there are situations, such as when two independent real
estate developers combine to joint venture a new project, when it is ap-
propriate that a traditional duty of loyalty, for example, usurping the entity
opportunity, should be limited by defining certain activities, such as en-
234. See supra diagram in text accompanying notes 222-23.
235. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1318(c) (West 2000).
236. UNIF. LTD. LtAB. Co. AcT§ 103(b)(4) (amended 1996), 6A U.L.A. 434 (Supp. 1999).
237. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/15-5(b)(7) (West 2000).
238. See supra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
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gaging in new ventures after completion of the joint venture, that would
not give rise to a cause of action. With this background in mind, let us
examine the decisions dealing with "opting out."
THE "OPTING OUT" CASES
One of the primary attractions of ULLCA to transactional lawyers is
that it explicitly enables them to specify in the operating agreement activ-
ities that would not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.239 As stated above,
Illinois has a similar provision.2 40 Litigation lawyers, however, have long
been aware that courts will generally respect an agreement of the parties
as to their relative rights and responsibilities, including those of a fiduciary
nature, so long as the agreement is sufficiently specific and not over-
reaching.24 1
In the LLC area, two recent decisions have determined whether the
activity of one member competing against another was actionable in light
of an agreement defining the responsibility of the member. In McConnell v.
Hunt Sports Enterprises,242 several investors were brought together for the
purpose of owning and operating a professional hockey franchise in Co-
lumbus, Ohio. Two of the leading investors were John McConnell and
Lamar Hunt (who controlled the Hunt Sports Group, L.L.C.). Section 3.3
of the operating agreement provided as follows: "Members May Compete.
Members shall not in any way be prohibited from or restricted in engaging
or owning an interest in any other business venture of any nature, including
any venture which might be competitive with the business of the
Company" 243
After several months of negotiations, a governmental subsidy did not
develop and Hunt was not inclined to go forward. Alternative financing
for a stadium was offered by an insurance company however, conditioned
upon a satisfactory lease. Hunt, without formally consulting the other
members of the LLC, rejected this option. When McConnell was ap-
proached by the insurance company, he offered to apply for the hockey
franchise and execute the lease himself. Other members joined with him
and he did in fact obtain the hockey franchise for Columbus. Hunt then
filed suit claiming that McConnell was breaching his fiduciary duty to the
LLC that had originally been formed by creating another venture and
obtaining the franchise for himself and other investors allied with him.
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of McConnell. 244
239. UNI. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 103, 6A U.L.A. 434.
240. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/15-5 (West 2000).
241. Dremco, Inc. v. S. Chapel Hill Gardens, Inc., 654 N.E.2d 501 (11. App. Ct. 1995).
242. 725 N.E.2d 1193 (1999).
243. Id. at 1206.
244. See id. at 1226.
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On appeal, the court first undertook to interpret the contract. Hunt
claimed that the reference to "any other business venture" meant a busi-
ness venture other than a hockey franchise. The court interpreted the word
'cother" to simply mean that the members could invest in another business
venture other than the LLC which was originally formed. The court fo-
cused on the words following "any other business venture" namely, "of
any nature," and indicated that such words "could not be broader.
'245
Moreover the inclusion of the words "any venture which might be com-
petitive with the business of the Company" made it clear that members
were not prohibited from engaging in a business that was competitive with
the initially formed LLC. 246
With respect to the fiduciary duty issue, the court stated that, because
the act of forming a competing enterprise was specifically approved by the
agreement, "these acts in and of themselves would not constitute breach
of fiduciary duty because the operating agreement allowed such acts."
'247
The trial court did recognize that the method of competing could give rise
to a breach of fiduciary duty and the appellate court agreed, stating:
[] he trial court sustained the objection to such question, stating that
competing for a franchise was not a breach of fiduciary duty and that
it was "the method of competing for the franchise which might be a
breach of fiduciary duty. If in the parlance of the street Mr. Mc-
Connell engaged in dirty pool to compete for this contract, then that
type of competition could be a breach of fiduciary duty." These rul-
ings were not erroneous.
The appellate court concluded: "[C]ontract provisions may affect the
scope of fiduciary duties, and as such, the trial court was correct to indicate
that the method of competing, not the competing itself, may constitute a
breach of fiduciary duty."
248
A similar, though more complex issue, was presented to the court in
Metro River Boat Associates, Inc. v. Bally's Louisiana, Inc.24 9 Here the issue was
whether the merger of Bally into Hilton constituted a breach of the op-
erating agreement's non-competition provisions. Metro and Bally orga-
nized Belle of Orleans L.L.C. to own and operate a gambling river boat
in Orleans parish. The non-competition section of the operating agree-
ment provided as follows:
]he creation of the Company and the assumption by the Members
of their duties thereunder shall be without prejudice to the rights of
the Members (or the right of their Affiliates) to maintain, expand or
245. Id. at 1206.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1212.
248. Id.
249. 706 So. 2d 553 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
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diversify other interests and activities including, but not limited to,
gaming interests and activities, and to receive and enjoy profits or
compensation therefrom. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence,
no Member may engage in any gaming venture (other than [Bally's
Casino Lakeshore Resort]) in Orleans Parish or Jefferson Parish.
Within the [surrounding] parishes ... (the "Other Parishes"), (i) Bally
Member and its Affiliates can provide management services ... ;
provided that neither Bally Member nor any its Affiliates (as the case
may be) may own an equity interest in such ventures .... 250
Hilton Hotels did have an ownership interest in another Orleans Parish
river boat casino. Consequently, Metro interpreted the merger between
Bally and Hilton to violate the noncompetition provision of the operating
agreement. Although some portions of the operating agreement dealt with
either a Member or an Affiliate-Hilton was an Affiliate of Bally since it
owned stock in Bally-the non-competition provision only prohibited a
member (namely Bally) from engaging in another gaming venture in Or-
leans Parish. Accordingly, the court held that there was no breach of the
non-competition provision. 25 '
While the decision of the court in interpreting the agreement was ar-
guably hyper-technical, plaintiff's allegation of competition was also hyper-
technical. Although the record is not clear on this point, the merger of
Bally into Hilton did not create additional competition. Rather Hilton was
already operating a competing gaming venture.
The language in the operating agreement with respect to fiduciary du-
ties was critical in another recent case, Lynch Multimedia Corp. v. Carson
Communications, L.L. C.252 This case involved both competing with the entity
and the entity opportunity doctrine. CLR Video was a cable TV joint
venture with three members, Lynch Multimedia (60%), Rainbow Com-
munications (20%), and the Robert C. Carson Trust (20%). There was a
five person board of managers: Lynch named three managers and Rain-
bow and the Trust one each. Robert C. Carson was the president.
Carson learned in 1996 that other cable systems, Falcon, Westcom, and
Galaxy, might be for sale. According to plaintiff, in the fall of 1996 the
members approved certain possible acquisitions. In late summer of 1997,
Carson informed Lynch representatives of specific opportunities. Lynch
suggested further exploration. In April 1998, Carson again met with
Lynch representatives. No agreement to purchase was reached and, ac-
cording to Carson and another witness, Lynch rejected the acquisitions.
In May, Carson, through Carson Communications, L.L.C., reached an
agreement to acquire Falcon, but Galaxy was unwilling to sell. In October
1998, Carson wrote Lynch, proposing plans to acquire Falcon and Wes-
250. Id. at 559.
251. See id. at 560.
252. 102 F. Supp. 2d. 1261 (D. Kan. 2000).
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trom. In November, he sent a term sheet on these possible acquisitions to
Lynch, and in December sent Lynch another term sheet which also pro-
posed changes in CLR's operating agreement-in particular that his salary
and equity interest in CRL would be increased and he would continue as
president.
In Spring 1999, Carson Communications closed on the Falcon and
Westcom deals. Prior to closing, Lynch alleged it had sought to exercise
its proportionate (60%) interest in the deals. Section 11.4 of the CLR
operating agreement provided that an "opportunity... to purchase cable
television systems ... shall be first offered to the company" 253 Carson
responded that his duty under section 11.4 was satisfied when he notified
the other members that an opportunity existed. On the other hand,
Lynch's position was that Carson could not fulfill his duty unless he pre-
sented the other members with a "no-strings-attached" purchase offer at
a properly-called special meeting of the members.2 54
Under a typical entity opportunity situation, Lynch's position might
prevail. The court rejected Lynch's position, however, based upon the
language of the agreement:
The court finds that this interpretation must be rejected. First, looking
just to the plain language of § 11.4, it would appear that the Oper-
ating Agreement does not intend the standard legal definition of "of-
fer." Under this provision, the member does not offer an "offer" to
the other members in the sense that it could be "accepted" or con-
cluded. The member merely offers knowledge of an opportunity. '255
In addition, the court opined that section 11.4 must be read in light of the
entire operating agreement, particularly section 11.2 which provided:
Other Interests. Any Member or Manager may engage indepen-
dently or with others in other business ventures of every nature and
description. Neither the Company nor any Member shall have any
right by virtue of this Agreement of the relationship created hereby
in or to any other ventures or activities in which any Member or
Manager is involved or to the income or proceeds derived therefrom.
The pursuit of other ventures and activities by Members or Managers
is hereby consented to by the Members and shall not be deemed
wrongful or improper.25 6
The court appeared to view the explicit right to compete as watering
down the obligations under the entity opportunity doctrine. The court also
rejected Lynch's argument that any tender of an opportunity must be at
253. Id. at 1261-63.
254. Id. at 1264.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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a formally called members' meeting. CLR had consistently operated in an
informal manner and Lynch had acquiesced in this approach. The court
concluded:
In short, Carson informed the other members of CLR Video of cer-
tain opportunities to purchase cable companies. Only after the pas-
sage of several months or years, and at one point after the rejection
of the proposal, did Carson independently acquire the companies.
Under the facts presented to the court, the plaintiff has demonstrated
neither a breach of the Operating Agreement nor of the defendants'
fiduciary duties.257
The foregoing cases illustrate that courts are very willing to give effect
to the agreement of sophisticated parties who modify their fiduciary re-
sponsibility to each other by express provisions in the operating or other
agreement. Because courts will parse these agreements carefully, it is im-
portant that such agreements be carefully drafted to give effect to the fully
informed intentions of the parties. It would be a serious mistake for pro-
visions limiting fiduciary duties to turn into boilerplate. It is also important
for courts to scrutinize these agreements all the more carefully when the
parties involved are less sophisticated. In my experience, when unsophis-
ticated parties are presented with a long and complex agreement, they
often assume that what they are signing embodies standard provisions and
rely upon their lawyers to direct them to critical provisions. Lawyers must
fulfil this responsibility very carefully.
TRANSFERABILITY, DISSOLUTION, AND
DISASSOCIATION
The concepts of transferability, dissolution, and disassociation are
among the more complex issues in LLC statutes. To appreciate the stat-
utory provisions, it is necessary to have an historical perspective. A major
reason for organizing an LLC is to avoid an entity level tax and obtain
pass-through, or partnership, tax treatment as opposed to corporate tax
treatment. At one point, the issue of whether the IRS would recognize
that an LLC could be taxed as a partnership hinged upon the extent to
which the entity exhibited certain characteristics that are common to cor-
porations, but are usually absent from partnerships. 258
The treasury regulations at one time specified that the four character-
istics for distinguishing a corporation from a partnership were (i) continuity
of life, (ii) limited liability, (iii) free transferability of interest, and (iv) cen-
tralization of management.2 59 In actuality, the treasury regulations iden-
257. Id. at 1247.
258. See supra notes 3-8, 20, and accompanying text.
259. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1)-(2) (1997) (text set forth in Appendix 8) (subsequently
modified to provide simply for checking a box). See supra note 8.
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tiffed six factors that were characteristic of corporations, but two of these
characteristics; associates and carrying on a business, were also common
to partnerships. Thus, these latter two did not apply in determining
whether or not an entity had more corporate characteristics than non-
corporate characteristics.
The regulations essentially provided that an unincorporated entity
would be taxed as a partnership unless it exhibited three of the four cor-
porate characteristics. Consequently, if a limited liability company pos-
sessed fewer than three of the four corporate characteristics, the organi-
zation could be taxed as a partnership for tax purposes. Because a primary
reason in organizing an LLC was to obtain limited liability treatment, it
thus became necessary to negate two of the other three corporate char-
acteristics-centralized management, transferability, or continuity-in or-
der to achieve pass-through tax treatment.
Consequently, the first generation of LLC statutes was designed to fa-
cilitate pass-through tax treatment by having default provisions that would
negate transferability or continuity of existence. The issue of centralized
management was essentially determined by whether the LLC was
member-managed or manager-managed. If it were member-managed,
then normally it would not have the corporate characteristic of centralized
management, but if it were manager-managed, then it was essential to
negate both transferability and continuity of existence in order to achieve
partnership status and pass-through tax treatment.
TRANSFERABILITY
With respect to transferability, the Illinois Act, as originally enacted,
provided as follows:
Unless provided otherwise in the articles of organization or the op-
erating agreement, if the members of the limited liability company,
other than the member proposing to dispose of the interest, do not
approve of the proposed transfer or assignment by unanimous consent,
the transferee or assignee of the interest shall have no right to par-
ticipate in the management of the business and affairs of the limited
liability company or to become a member.260
This provision is actually a second generation type statute, because it per-
mits the operating agreement to modify the default statutory provision
that unanimous consent of the other members is necessary for a particular
member to transfer his or her interest and constitute the transferee a mem-
260. 1992 IlH. Laws 2529 § 30-5 (1992) (emphasis added).
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ber in his or her stead.26' A first generation statute would preclude trans-
ferability unless there was unanimous consent.
262
The above provision, together with sections 30-10 and 30-15 were re-
pealed by the 1998 amendments to the Illinois act and replaced sections
30-5 and 30-10,263 which mirror the provisions in ULLCA. 26 4 The ap-
proach in Delaware is similar to ULLCA. 265 Although the new provisions
are more complex, they basically do not change the essential statutory
scheme that an assignee of a member does not become a member except
with the unanimous consent of the other members, unless the operating agree-
ment provides otherwise. The basic operative provision today is section 30-10,
patterned after section 503 of ULLCA, which provides: 'A transferee of a
distributional interest may become a member of a limited liability com-
pany if and to the extent that the transferor gives the transferee the right
in accordance with authority described in the operating agreement or all
other members consent. '266 The change worked by ULLCA is basically
one of emphasis, putting the focus on the operating agreement in the first
instance. If there is no specific provision in the operating agreement, how-
ever, the default provision is that a transferee does not become a member
unless all the other members so agree. The balance of the provisions in
section 30-10 basically set forth the rights of a transferee who does not
become a member and the obligations of the transferor.
Under the flexibility of the Illinois Act, either as originally enacted or
as modified in line with ULLCA, it should be possible to provide in the
operating agreement that membership interests are freely transferable. To-
day this would not be problematic. Prior to the check-the-box regulations,
261. See supra notes 17-20.
262. For example, with respect to transferability, the Wyoming statute, as originally en-
acted, provided that:
The interest of all members in a limited liability company constitutes the personal estate
of the member, and may be transferred or assigned as provided in the operating agree-
ment. However, iall of the other members of the limited liability company other than the
member proposing to dispose of his or its interest do not approve of the proposed transfer
or assignment by unanimous written consent, the transferee of the member's interest shall
have no right to participate in the management of the business and affairs ofthe limited liability
company or to become a member. The transferee shall only entitled to receive the share of
profits or other compensation by way of income and the return of contributions, to
which that member would otherwise be entitled.
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-122 (Michie 1999) (emphasis added). This statute was so bullet-
proof that the operating agreement could not vary it unless the LLC opted to become a
"flexible" LLC, WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-107(x), in which case the operating agreement
could vary the statutory default. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-144(b).
263. PA. 90-424, effective January 1, 1998, codified at 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/
30-5, 30-10 (West 2000).
264. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT §§ 502 & 503, 6A U.L.A. 468-69 (1995).
265. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-702 (1999).
266. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/30-10(a) (West 2000).
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however, such a provision in an operating agreement could have destroyed
the opportunity for a manager-managed LLC to be taxed as a partnership.
Even today, if the interests are publicly traded, an LLC or partnership will
be taxed as a corporation rather than a partnership. 267
Because, with regard to transferability, the focus is now on the operating
agreement, the question then arises as to what should such agreement
provide with respect to transferability The issue here is not substantially
different from the issue under the corporate form of doing business. Some
of the same basic principles apply.
If the entity is closely held, providing legal transferability does not nec-
essarily equate to transferability in fact. In providing a common law def-
inition for a closely held corporation, the court in Galler v. Galler,2 68 a
frequently cited case, stated: "For our purposes, a close corporation is one
in which the stock is held in a few hands, or in a few families, and wherein
it is not at all, or only rarely, dealt in by buying and selling."'269
The fact that there is generally no market for interests in an entity does
not mean, however, that it is not appropriate to restrict the transfer of
interests in such entity. It may be undesirable to have a spouse or a non-
employee succeed to an interest. Certainly, you would not want a com-
petitor to have an interest.
Typically, in an LLC, transfer requires the approval of the remaining
members. But should such approval require unanimity or mere majority,
and if by a majority, is it a majority in number (per capita) or a majority in
financial interest (per capital)? In the corporate form, approval at the board
level is generally per capita and approval at the shareholder level is generally
per capital, but if there are three or less members with equal investment,
the difference between majority and unanimity is academic.
For ease of illustration, assume a situation where the approval of the
remaining members is to be done on a per capita basis. If there are three
or less members, the remaining members will be two or less, and a majority
of two is two. Thus, a majority vote in this circumstance requires unanim-
ity. Similarly, if there are three members with equal investment, the re-
maining two will each have fifty percent vis-A-vis each other and the affir-
mative vote of both would be necessary to approve a transfer.
Because relationships in a closely held organization are generally impor-
tant, it will normally be desirable to require that the remaining members
consent before a transferee can become a member. But every general prop-
osition will typically have exceptions. Frequently, there is an exception for
transfers to a family member. This facilitates estate planning; it also fulfils
the desire of some entrepreneurs to create a family business that can be
transmitted to their children. Every coin has two sides, however; and there
267. See 26 U.S.C. § 7704 (1994).
268. 203 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. 1964).
269. See id. at 583.
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is no assurance that members of a second generation will have the talent or
personality that made the first generation member a good "partner."
Under ULLCA-type statutory provisions, "[a] transferee who does not
become a member is not entitled to participate in the management or
conduct of the limited liability company's business, require access to in-
formation concerning the company's transactions, or inspect or copy any
of the company's records." 270 Although a transferee has some limited eco-
nomic rights, 27' the most obvious characteristic of a transferee is impo-
tence. Since powerlessness is not an enviable position, there are few cir-
cumstances in which a person would be willing to purchase a member's
interest without absolute assurance that the purchaser would become a
member.
This situation is particularly acute in the event of death situation. In the
corporate context, the spouse of a deceased shareholder succeeds to the
shares and, with cumulative voting,272 may be able to obtain a seat on
the board of directors. In the LLC context under ULLCA, however, death
is a dissociating event, not a dissolving event.273 Accordingly, the surviving
spouse or estate is a mere transferee and, unless the operating agreement
provides otherwise, under ULLCA there is no right to information or to
be bought out until the expiration of the term,2 74 which arguably could
be perpetual.2 75 In Illinois, dissociation would normally give rise to a buy-
out at fair value, 276 but this right could be circumscribed in the operating
agreement.
CASE LAW UNDER TRANSFERABILITY
Great care must be exercised both in drafting the transferability provi-
sions of the operating agreement and in drafting any consent to transfer.
The default provisions of the statute can create a form of Russian Roulette:
last to die wins. This is illustrated by the case of Lusk v. Elliott.277 The LLC
in question was formed by Lusk, as Trustee for the Citation Realty Trust,
270. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 503(d), 6A U.L.A. 468 (1995); 805 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 180/30-10(d) (West 2000).
271. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 503(e), 6A U.L.A. 468 (1995); 805 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 180/30-10(e) (West 2000).
272. The mechanics and consequences of cumulative voting are extensively discussed in
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 114, §§ 9.14-.19.
273. See infra notes 277-80 and accompanying text for discussion of problems created by
death.
274. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 603(a)(2)(ii) (amended 1996), 6A U.L.A. 66 (Supp.
1999).
275. ULLCA does not specifically provide that the term could be perpetual but the term
could be at least 50 years. See id. § 203 Comment, 6A U.L.A. 445 (1995). Illinois speaks of
the "latest date, if any," at which the LLC will dissolve. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/
5-5(a)(6) (West 2000) (emphasis added). This implicitly suggests a perpetual term.
276. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/35-55(a) (West 2000).
277. 1999 WL 644739 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 1999).
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which was a one percent owner, and the late Mr. Elliott, who was the
manager and owned the other ninety-nine percent interest, to own and
operate an airplane. The Trust managed the airplane's daily operations
and finances and received a management fee for such services. The op-
erating agreement had an absolute prohibition against the transfer of a
member's interest but could be amended by a unanimous vote of the
members.
Mr. Elliott was seriously ill and, in anticipation of his imminent death,
Lusk and Mrs. Elliott, as attorney-in-fact for Mr. Elliott, executed a "Con-
sent to Assignment" of his "entire and undivided membership interest" to
the Elliott Trust and agreed that such assignment "shall not constitute a
prohibited assignment" under the operating agreement, and that the in-
tent was "to preserve for Neal M. Elliott the beneficial ownership of his
membership interests."2 78 Mrs. Elliott then assigned on his behalf his
membership interest to the Elliott Trust.
Mrs. Elliott wanted to sell the plane, which would end the management
contract with the Lusk Trust, and noticed a members meeting. In response,
Lusk, purportedly as sole member, amended the operating agreement to
specify that the Lusk Trust was the sole member and filed the present suit.
Lusk contended that the assignment transferred only Mr. Elliott's benefi-
cial financial interest and not his membership interest, while Mrs. Elliott
contended that the assignment transferred the entire membership interest.
If Lusk were correct, his trust would be the sole remaining member and
would manage the company, and would preserve the existing management
contract with his trust. If Mrs. Elliott were correct, her trust would be a
ninety-nine percent member and would manage the company.
The court entered summary judgment for Mrs. Elliott. The court first
found that the language of the Consent to Assignment amended the op-
erating agreement. Otherwise the assignment would have been a prohib-
ited assignment. Under Delaware law, a mere assignment transfers only a
financial interest and not the membership interest.2 79 Lusk contended that
because the document in question was labeled an 'Assignment," it only
transferred Mr. Elliott's financial interest but did not constitute the Elliott
Trust as a member. The court held, however, that the interest assigned
was Mr. Elliot's "entire undivided membership interest," and thus trans-
ferred "the entirety of Mr. Elliott's membership interest to the Trust." 280
At a bare minimum, the litigation in this case teaches that if you want
to transfer a membership interest, call the document a "transfer" and not
an "assignment." In addition spell out specifically that the transferee be-
comes a member. But should this nitpicking be necessary? The following
section will discuss how the ULLCA approach facilitates continuity by
278. Id. at *2.
279. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-702(a) (1999).
280. Lusk, 1999 WL 644739, at *5.
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changing the partnership "events of dissolution" into events of dissociation.
With respect to transfer of an LLC interest, why do we retain the part-
nership concept that assignment of an interest transfers only a financial
interest and not a management interest? Limiting who can manage makes
sense in a partnership context where a partner can expose other partners
to unlimited liability. It makes less sense in the LLC context where member
liability is limited.
DISSOLUTION
While the provisions in the third generation statutes with respect to
transfer of interests are more complex, they do not work a substantial
change in the essence of the statutory provisions. On the other hand, the
provisions with respect to dissolution have been dramatically changed as
a result of ULLCA.281 In essence, the circumstances which would auto-
matically cause dissolution have been substantially limited and, in their
stead, a new concept, that of "disassociation," has been introduced into
the statutory provisions. These changes have been motivated by the fact
that it is no longer necessary to "kill" continuity of existence as a char-
acteristic of an LLC in order to obtain partnership tax treatment. Although
LLCs can be used for a variety of purposes, from holding real estate to
operating a commercial business, most commercial business operations
would desire more stability than that afforded by the "events of dissolu-
tion" in the earlier statutes.
For purposes of comparison, both the original Illinois Act and the cur-
rent Illinois Act provided that a limited liability company could be
dissolved on the basis of (i) an event specified in the operating agreement
or articles of organization, 282 (ii) the consent of the members, (iii) the entry
of a decree of judicial dissolution, and (iv) administrative dissolution.2 83
The big difference between the two statutes, however, is that the original
Act provided that an LLC would be dissolved, unless otherwise provided
in the articles of organization or the operating agreement, upon the fol-
lowing "events of dissolution:" "[t]he death, retirement, resignation,
bankruptcy, court declaration of incompetence with respect to, or disso-
lution of, a member or upon the occurrence of any other event that ter-
28 1. Even the title of the Illinois chapter has been changed from "Dissolution" alone to
"Dissolution and Disassociation." See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/35 (West 2000).
282. The original act required these events to be set forth in the articles whereas the
current act permits them to be set forth in the operating agreement. See id. 180/35-1(1).
Contrast this with section 35-1(1) of the original statute. 1992 IIl. Laws 2529.
283. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/35-1(2), (4)-(6) (West 2000). Compare with § 35-
1(2)(4)(5) and § 35-5 (now repealed) of the original act. 1992 II. Laws 2529. The new Act
also provides that an LLC is dissolved upon the occurrence of an event that makes the
continuation of the business unlawful. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAr. ANN. 180/35-1(3) (West
2000).
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minates the continued membership of the member in the limited liability
company" 284
This is no longer true in the current Act. What the foregoing reflects is
that new statutes, patterned after ULLCA, take an entity approach to an
LLC, whereas the first (and second) generation statutes took a "partner-
ship" type approach. Because a partnership is a "person-oriented" type
of business organization, any change in the relation of the partners would
result in the dissolution of the partnership. Thus, a partnership lacks con-
tinuity of existence, whereas, in the approach introduced by ULLCA, it
was sought in general to create greater continuity of existence, and thus
more stability, for an LLC as a default condition.
DISSOCIATION
Although ULLCA-based statutes no longer have the foregoing "events
of dissolution," these activities now basically result in a member being
"disassociated" from a limited liability company.28 5 When a member dis-
associates, whether through withdrawal, transfer of the member's interest,
expulsion, bankruptcy, death, or incompetency, the member's right to par-
ticipate in management and the member's fiduciary duties all terminate, 286
and unless the operating agreement otherwise provides, 28 7 the company is
obligated to purchase the member's distributional interests for its fair
value-assuming that the members disassociation does not result in dis-
solution. 288
Thus, unless the operating agreement eliminates the obligation of the
LLC to purchase the member's interest on dissolution, the result under
the two Illinois statutes from the member's perspective is fairly similar.
Under the original statute, the event of dissolution would give rise to dis-
solution and the member would receive the value of his distributional
interest upon the liquidation of the LLC whereas, under the current stat-
ute, the member is entitled to the fair value of such distributional interest.
284. 1992 11. Laws 2529, § 35-1(3). With respect to the last event of dissolution, namely
the termination of membership, the original Act provided that dissolution would be avoided
if "within 90 days after the event there are at least two remaining members and all the
remaining members agree to continue the business of the limited liability company." Al-
though it is not clear, arguably this language could also prevent dissolution with respect to
other events such as death or bankruptcy.
285. UNIF. LTD. LA3. Co. ACT § 601, 6A U.L.A. 471 (1985); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 180/35-45.
286. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 603(b), 6A U.L.A. 475 (1995); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 180/35-55(b).
287. 805 ILL. ComP. STAT. ANN. 180/15-5(b)(5). ULLCA's provisions in this regard are
more complicated, differentiating between a term LLC and an LLC at will. In a term LLC,
the LLC can defer purchasing the member's interest until the expiration of the term. UNIF.
LTD. LLAB. Co. AcT § 701(a)(2), 6A U.L.A. 476 (1995).
288. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/35-60(a),
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From the company's perspective under the new act, however, a former
"event of dissolution" has no effect on the continued existence of the LLC.
In theory the value of an interest under the two different approaches
outlined above-liquidation and purchase at fair value-should be com-
parable. The concept of fair value embodies within it the value of a com-
pany as a going concern, not just the dead asset or book value. 289 With
respect to dissolution of a limited liability company, the persons winding
up the limited liability company's business "may preserve the company's
business or property as a going concern for a reasonable time." 290 Implicit
in this provision is the obligation of the members liquidating the limited
liability company business to obtain the going concern value of the business
in selling its assets and then making distribution to the members. If there
are no ready buyers for the assets, they may not be able to obtain the going
concern value of the enterprise. On the other hand, the buyer of the assets
often will be the other members. In such a case, there is a conflict of interest
for them between their role in buying the assets and their role in liquidating
the assets on behalf of the LLC. In this situation it is important for courts
to be vigilant to ensure that the members pay "fair value" for the assets. 291
The dissolution and disassociation provisions in the current Illinois Act
are approximately triple the length of such provisions in the original Act.
The complexity probably has also tripled. Yet at the core, what is involved
here is simply the introduction of a new concept, "disassociation," for the
old, "events of dissolution," with the result that these events no longer
cause a "dissolution" of the enterprise but merely entitle the member to
a payout, unless such right is modified in the operating agreement.
If an LLC is dissolved, ULLCA-based statutes provide for the means of
dealing with the claims of creditors against a dissolved limited liability
company.292 These provisions are essentially borrowed from recent cor-
porate law statutory developments. 293 Arguably, in dissolving an LLC, it
would be a breach of the duty of care for a member, or malpractice, for
a lawyer representing an LLC not to take advantage of the opportunity to
bar claims against the dissolved company, and derivatively against its mem-
bers, by complying with the "probate" type procedures that now exist
when an LLC is "killed."
289. See BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 114, § 19.2.
290. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/ 3 5-4(c).
291. BUSINESS ORGANizATIONs, supra note 114, §§ 18.13-18.14.
292. UNHr. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT §§ 807, 808, 6A U.L.A. 486 (1995); 805 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 180/25-45, 25-50.
293. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. §§ 14.06 -.07 (1984).
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CASE LAW DEALING WITH DISSOLUTIONAND
DISSOCIATION
As discussed above, even statutes that are not as prolix, oddly organized,
and unevenly flowing as the Delaware statute2 94 are nonetheless fairly com-
plex in dealing with liquidation, dissolution, transfer, and dissociation is-
sues. These are concepts with which courts do not come into contact on
a day-to-day basis.
The potential confusion in this area is illustrated by a Georgia case,
Walker v. Virtual Packaging, LLC,295 where certain members of the LLC sued
other members and the manager to dissolve the LLC and recover damages
for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. The members signed
both a members' agreement, which included a non-competition covenant,
and an operating agreement, which dealt with the management and
operations of the LLC. The members' agreement provided that the limited
liability company's members could not communicate with any employee
of the LLC to solicit the employee either to leave employment or to be-
come employed by a competitor.
The parties first entered into a consent order which provided for the
dissolution of the LLC and reserved the issues of breach of the non-
competition agreement and breach of fiduciary duty for trial. Thereafter,
the defendants moved for summary judgment on these other issues, con-
tending that no issue of damages remained after the dissolution of the
LLC. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs were not beneficiaries of
the non-compete agreement and therefore could not sue. Plaintiffs re-
sponded that when the LLC was dissolved, it implicitly assigned its causes
of action for damages to the individual members of the company. Plaintiffs
relied on the language of the consent order that distributed, pro rata, the
assets of the LLC to its members, and reserved any unresolved disputes
for later trial after the dissolution of the LLC.
The court set forth the argument of plaintiffs as follows:
Since the parties expressly reserved this claim unless it was disposed
of by the Consent Order and since the Consent Order specifically
did not dispose of it and specifically left all undisposed of claims open,
the sole remaining issue can only be whether-as a matter of law and
independent of the parties expressed agreement-a claim for dam-
ages originally belonging to a Limited Liability Company can be
distributed pro rata to the members upon dissolution. The claim by
[the LLC] against [d]efendants Sucher and Virtual is a "chose in
action" belonging to [the LLC] prior to its dissolution. The question
therefore must be whether such a chose in action is distributable to
294. See supra text at note 84 (characterization of the Delaware statute by Chief Justice
Veasey).
295. 493 S.E.2d 551 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
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the owners of [the LLC]. Clearly [the LLC] has attempted an as-
signment by its agreement to assign its property to its owners. 296
In rejecting plaintiffs' contention, the court stated:
Contrary to The Walker Plaintiffs' argument, the record shows that
[the LLC] did not assign a chose in action to the Walker Plaintiffs in
the Consent Order because [the LLC] did not comply with the terms
of the Operating Agreement regarding assignments. According to the
Operating Agreement, [the LLC] manager, Sucher could not, "with-
out the express consent" of one of the Walker Plaintiffs, Daniel L. Sessions,
execute assignments on behalf of [the LLC]. Neither the Consent
Order, nor any other part of the record shows such express consent.29
There are two problems with the court's treatment of this issue. First,
the provision in the operating agreement providing that the manager,
Sucher, could not make an assignment without the consent of one of the
Walker Plaintiffs was designed to protect the Walker Plaintiffs against any
inappropriate assignment of actions by Sucher. Apparently Sucher was
involved in a competing business and this provision of the operating agree-
ment would, for example, limit his flexibility in dealing with a competing
business by requiring the consent of a non-interested party, namely, Ses-
sions. This court, however, used a provision for the protection of the
Walker Plaintiffs to deny them the opportunity to be the assignee of
the LLC's claim against Sucher. This is a topsy-turvy interpretation of the
operating agreement.
But more importantly, when an LLC dissolves after creditors are paid
the balance of the assets are distributed to the members, not by virtue of
the grace of the operating agreement but rather pursuant to the mandate
of the statute. Business organization statutes typically have a survival of
remedy provision which provides that dissolution, during the period of the
survival of the remedy, shall not take away or impair any remedy available
to or against the entity, its managers, or its members for any claim existing
prior to the dissolution. 298 As a matter of logic, the claim against the
managers for breaching the non-compete provision was either extin-
guished upon dissolution or passed to the members.
There is some ambiguity in this area under ULLCA and statutes that
mirror it. ULLCA provides:
In winding up a limited liability company's business, the assets of the
company must be applied to discharge its obligations to creditors,
including members who are creditors. Any surplus must be applied
296. Id. at 554.
297. Id. at 555.
298. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STrAr. ANN. 5/12.80.
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to pay in money the net amount distributable to members in accor-
dance with their right to distributions under subsection (b).2 99
Because the statute provides that the surplus distributable to the members
must be paid in "money," arguably a chose of action is not distributable.
The rebuttal to this argument is that the purpose of the foregoing provision
is to negate an argument that a member is entitled to receive a distribution
in kind. Basically, upon dissolution, the assets of the business are converted
to cash, creditors are paid off, and the cash is distributed to the members.
If an asset is not readily convertible into cash at the time of dissolution,
however, this should not mean that it is not distributable. Escrows and the
like have been used for decades when a business is sold and the company
liquidated in order to transfer assets which could not then be converted
into cash.
Moreover, an interpretation that a chose in action that the company
possesses cannot be transferred to its members on liquidation would be
inconsistent with the statutory provision that "[e]ach member is entitled
to a distribution upon the winding up of the limited liability company's
business consisting of a return of all contributions which have not previ-
ously been returned and a distribution of any remainder in equal shares." 300
Because a chose in action is an asset, to the extent not reduced to cash, it
should be distributable to its members in equal shares.
Nevertheless, there may be a systemic problem in the legislation among
the states with the ability of an LLC, as opposed to an assignee of an LLC,
to pursue a claim after liquidation. When LLC statutes were drafted, the
focus was upon limiting liability. When ULLCA was drafted, the Uniform
Commissioners borrowed a fairly recent corporate law development,
namely a probate-type approach for known claims, 30 1 and a similar ap-
proach, involving notice by publication, for unknown (or contingent)
claims. 302 These developments on the corporate side were viewed as "lib-
eralizing," because the predecessor corporate approaches embodied a
"survival" approach which, generally, extended the life of a corporation
for only two years after dissolution for purpose of suits brought by or against
a corporation. 30 3 With respect to the typical unknown claim, such as a
products liability claim, two years was seen as too short a period; thus the
extension to five years. In the process of focusing upon liabilities and ex-
tending the period to five years for claims brought against the corporation,
299. UNIF. LTD. LIAt. Co. ACT § 806(a), 6A U.L.A. 486 (1995) (emphasis added); 805
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/35-10(a) (substantially identical).
300. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 806(b), 6A UL.A. 486 (1995) (emphasis added); 805
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/35-10(b).
301. See REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 14.06; 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 14-
48 (1998/1999 Supp.).
302. Id. § 14,07.
303. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 105 (1969).
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however, the provision was not likewise made to continue the survival of
claims by the corporation.
Not all states that followed the Model Act approach in extending the
period for suits against corporations to five years neglected to cover suits
by corporations. Illinois, for example provides:
The dissolution of a corporation either (1) by the issuance of a cer-
tificate of dissolution by the Secretary of State, or (2) by a judgment
of dissolution by a circuit court of this State, or (3) by expiration of
its period of duration, shall not take away nor impair any civil remedy
available to or against such corporation, its directors, or shareholders,
for any right or claim existing, or any liability incurred, prior to such
dissolution if action or other proceeding thereon is commenced
within five years after the date of such dissolution. Any such action
or proceeding by or against the corporation may be prosecuted or de-
fended by the corporation in its corporate name.30 4
ULLCA, however, and the states adopting it, have followed the Model Act
in dealing solely with claims against the entity. Because an LLC is a crea-
ture of statute, arguably the common law precedents dealing with survival
in the corporate context would be equally applicable to LLCs. On the
corporate side, a federal court summarized the common law background
as follows:
We begin with a few general observations on the question of corpo-
rate standing after dissolution. At common law, the dissolution of a
corporation terminated its legal existence. It could neither sue nor be
sued and even pending proceedings abated. See 2 Mod. Business
Corp. Act. Ann. S 105, P 2 (2d ed. 1970). Ultimately, every jurisdic-
tion adopted statutes allowing actions to be brought by or against
dissolved corporations and preventing actions from abating on dis-
solution, whether voluntarily or involuntarily or because of charter
expiration. Even when a statute continues the existence of a corpo-
ration for a certain period, however, it is generally held that the cor-
poration becomes defunct upon the expiration of such period, and,
in the absence of a provision to the contrary, no action afterwards
can be brought by or against it and must be dismissed. 16A W
Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations s 8144 (1962
Rev. Vol. By M. Wolf).305
Accordingly, unless there is an explicit survival of remedy provision on
behalf of claims by the LLC in an LLC statute, any claim by a dissolved
LLC may abate.
304. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.80 (emphasis added).
305. Canadian Ace Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 769, 771 (N.D.
Ill. 1978).
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The operation of the default provisions of a statute in which the "events
of dissolution" give rise to dissolution, rather than dissociation, is illustrated
by the case of Gee v. Bullock.30 6 Bullock, the defendant, and her partner,
Thow, had organized an LLC, "Thow Pasta" to operate a retail pasta
business. Disagreements arose between Bullock and Thow, and she locked
him out of the premises. The business was also in financial difficulty, so
she induced plaintiffs to invest in a second LLC, the Pasta Shop, with the
understanding that some of the funds would be used to pay the rent for
Thow Pasta. Bullock represented she was the sole owner of Thow. She
allegedly agreed to sign an operating agreement which would give defen-
dants a fifty-one percent controlling interest in the Pasta Shop. Within a
month of organizing the second LLC, Bullock refused to sign the operating
agreement and this time locked the plaintiffs out of the business. She then
obtained another investor to invest in the pasta business and formed a
corporation to which assets of the Pasta Shop were transferred.
Plaintiffs sought either an order permitting them to run the Pasta Shop
or a decree of dissolution. Because there was no operating agreement, the
court was faced with the task of applying the statutory provisions to this
set of facts. The Rhode Island statute set forth the classical events of dis-
solution as a basis to dissolve the entity:
A limited liability company is dissolved and its affairs shall be wound
up upon the happening of the first to occur of the following:
(d)[sic] the death, resignation, expulsion ... of a member ... unless
otherwise provided in the articles of organization or a written oper-
ating agreement. 30 7
The court treated defendant's lock-out of plaintiffs as a wrongful expulsion
of plaintiffs, thereby triggering a dissolution of the Pasta Shop. The court
denied plaintiffs' request for an order permitting them to run the business
because "Pasta [Shop] as a business entity ceased to exist for any purpose
other than winding-up." 30 8
Because of Bullock's fraud, however, the court granted plaintiffs an eq-
uitable lien on her assets if, upon the winding up of the Pasta Shop, plain-
tiffs did not recover their investment. Since the assets of the Pasta Shop
were transferred to the new corporation, the court then undertook to treat
such transfer as a fraudulent conveyance, and plaintiffs as creditors, so that
plaintiffs could invoke the Fraudulent Conveyance Act. The court rea-
soned that a withdrawing member was entitled to a distribution equal to
the fair value of the member's interest as of the date of withdrawal, 309 and
306. 1996 WL 937009 (R.I. Ct. Super. 1996).
307. Id. at *4 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-16-39 (1999)).
308. Id.
309. R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-16-29 (1992). The statute has since been amended to negate
the right to the fair value upon withdrawal unless so provided in the operating agreement.
HeinOnline  -- 56 Bus. Law.  561 2000-2001
562 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 56, February 2001
that a member who is entitled to a distribution "has the status of, and is
entitled to all remedies available to, a creditor of the limited liability com-
pany." 3 10 Therefore, plaintiffs, who were expelled, were, in effect, with-
drawn and accordingly entitled to a distribution-thereby giving them the
status of creditors who could sue under the Fraudulent Conveyance Act
to set aside the transfer of the Pasta Shop's assets.
The court certainly manifested an understanding of the intricacies of
the LLC statute and reached an equitable result. But the statutory provi-
sions, especially as the court applied them, are themselves inconsistent.
Expulsion and withdrawal, although both on an "exit" continuum, are
antithetical to each other. Withdrawal is a voluntary act of a member and
expulsion is an involuntary act; yet the court treated plaintiffs as being
both expelled and withdrawing.
Moreover, because either expulsion or resignation (withdrawing) are
"events of dissolution," after which the task of the LLC is to wind-up, that
is, convert its assets to cash, pay off creditors, and distribute the balance
to its members, it is inconsistent, once dissolution is triggered by expulsion,
to initiate an independent fair value proceeding in which one set of mem-
bers is bought out during the winding-up process and the other members
get what is left over.3 11
Parenthetically, in 1997, the Rhode Island Act was amended to reverse
the effect of withdrawal. Now, upon withdrawal, a member explicitly is
not entitled to a distribution unless the operating agreement so provides.3 12
This is part of a trend, which gained momentum after the check-the-box
regulations, to move the structure of the LLC from a partnership format
to more of a corporate format, particularly with respect to continuity of
existence or, more concisely, stability3 13 The third generation statutes, in-
troducing the concept of dissociation, accomplish this by removing the
"events of dissolution," i.e., withdrawal, expulsion, death, and the like,
from a liquidation trigger and encompassing them within the new concept
"dissociation." As previously discussed, an "event of dissociation" does not
cause dissolution and the entity continues its legal existence.3 14
Under most dissociation statutes, however, dissociation does provide the
dissociated member with a right to recover the fair value of her investment,
unless the operating agreement provides otherwise.3 1 5 Thus, were Rhode
Island to have had a third generation statute applicable to the facts in Gee,
plaintiffs would have been entitled to a fair value distribution, because they
were dissociated, whether by expulsion or withdrawal, and there was no
operating agreement, so the statutory default requiring purchase of their
310. See id, §7-16-33.
311. See id. § 7-16-29.
312. See id,
313. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
314. See supra text accompanying notes 289-90.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 286-88.
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interest at fair value would have been applicable. Under the statute as
amended in 1997, however, the statutory default position, when there is
no operating agreement, is that there is no right to a distribution upon
withdrawal. Thus, the statutory analysis upon which the court embarked
in Gee would come to no avail were it to arise in 1998 when the new
statutory provisions would be applicable to all LLCs. Thus, Gee is of little
vitality today.
The Gee court also dealt with the issue of who was entitled to participate
in the winding up of Pasta Shop. The statute provided that "members who
have not wrongfully dissolved" from LLC can so participate. 316 The court
opined that Bullock was not entitled to participate, because her expulsion
of plaintiffs was wrongful. The court then appointed a lawyer to wind-up
the business, and charged the lawyer's fee to Bullock because of her wrong-
ful actions. This raises the issue of why plaintiffs were not entitled to wind-
up the business because they did not wrongfully dissolve it.
Once again, the statutes are not as clear as would appear at first blush
on the issue of who is entitled to wind up an LLC. It may be that the Gee
court believed that the plaintiffs, who were expelled, were no longer mem-
bers and thus were outside the statutory provision permitting "good"
members to wind-up. This same issue, in a slightly different context, arose
in Investcorp v. Simpson Investment Co., L.C.3 17 Two brothers, and their re-
spective families, each had a fifty percent interest in an LLC that owned
104 acres of land. The four managers were the two brothers and a son of
each.3 18 A dispute arose as to the development of the land and most of
the Alfred Simpson family, with the exception of son Mark as trustee,
withdrew.319 The Donald Simpson family remained as members. Under
the Kansas statutes, such withdrawal dissolved the LLC. Because the op-
erating agreement permitted withdrawal after six month's notice (which
was given), the withdrawal of most of one branch of the family did not
violate the agreement, and so the withdrawal of the Alfred Simpson mem-
bers was not wrongful. The issue then arose as to who would be entitled
to wind-up the LLC.
The Kansas statute then in effect provided that the "managers in office
at the time of dissolution" wind-up the business.32O This arguably is a clear
provision that the two brothers and their sons would manage the process.
316. R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-16-45(a) (1999).
317. 983 P2d 265 (Kan. 1999).
318. See 267 Kan. 885 (1999), for modification of original opinion.
319. Mark, as trustee, did not withdraw because the unanimous consent of the remaining
members was necessary to continue the company. Mark's opposition to continuation assured
that the company would be dissolved. Section 17-7622 of the Kansas Annotated Statutes
was in force when the LLC was organized. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7622 (1995). This statute
was later amended to permit continuation by majority vote and this, in turn, was superceded
by a new statute. 1999 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 119, § 87.
320. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7627(b).
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The remaining Simpsons argued, however, that the withdrawing Simpsons
(two of whom were managers) were no longer members (and therefore
they arguably were also no longer managers). To resolve this matter, the
trial court looked to the operating agreement, section 9.2 of which pro-
vided that the "Members" wind-up the business.3 2 1 The trial court con-
strued this as excluding the withdrawing members from participation.3 22
On appeal, plaintiffs argued that section 9.2 did not discriminate be-
tween "remaining members" and "former members," and as former
members with a remaining economic interest, they should be entitled to
participate in winding-up. Although this argument might appear to be
sophistry, plaintiffs garnered support from other provisions of the operating
agreement which at times used the term "Members" and at other times
used the phrase "Remaining Members."3 23
The Kansas supreme court looked to legislation in other states but found
no pattern. For example, Georgia provided that the "members or man-
agers in control prior to dissolution" may wind-up,3 24 whereas Maryland
provides that only "remaining members" 325 may participate in winding
up. The court also pointed out that, although ULLCA 326 excludes man-
agers or members who dissolve wrongfully, "Kansas does not distinguish
between wrongful and rightful dissolving members." 327
The court decided that the term"member" included a withdrawing
member having a financial interest in the company's assets. The court
found strong support for this position in the provision in the operating
agreement that liquidation proceeds should be distributed "to the Members
in accordance with their respective positive Capital Account balances. '328
In this context, the term "members" clearly must include "withdrawing
members" or withdrawal would work a forfeiture of the withdrawing mem-
bers' interest in the LLC.
As the court in Investcorp observed, ULLCA provides that "a member
who has not wrongfully dissociated" may participate in winding up the
LLC after dissolution. 329 Illinois has the same provision, 330 while Delaware
takes a different tack. The Delaware statute provides that "a manager who
has not wrongfully dissolved" an LLC can participate in winding up unless
there is no such person. 331 If that is the case, then the members can choose
321. Investcorp, 983 P.2d at 268.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 270.
324. Id. (citing GA. COnE ANN. § 14-1 1-604(a) (1994)).
325. Id. (citing MD. CORP. & Assoc. CODE ANN. § 4A-904(a) (1998 Supp.)).
326. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 803(a), 6A U.L.A. 484 (1995).
327. Investcorp, 983 P.2d at 265, 270.
328. Id. at 271 (citing the operating agreement).
329. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 803(a), 6A U.L.A. 484 (1995).
330. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/35-4(a).
331. DEIL. CODic ANN. tit. 6, § 18-803(a) (1999).
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the person[s] who will wind up the business. 332 In this latter situation,
however, there is no disqualification for a "bad" member to participate.
All of these provisions are potentially problematic in their application. 333
A basic flaw in both ULLCA and Illinois is the provision that a member
who has not wrongfully dissociated may participate in the dissolution pro-
cess. The typical events of dissociation, including withdrawal and expul-
sion, do not normally trigger dissolution. In addition, who is a "wrongfully
dissociating" person? Very likely, someone who withdraws prior to the
terms of an LLC has wrongfully dissociated. Again, however, this activity
will not normally trigger dissolution. Another issue would be whether
someone who is expelled has wrongfully dissociated. It would not seem
that the plaintiffs in Gee, who were locked out and thus expelled, acted
"wrongfully" in any sense. 334
From a different perspective, has someone who has died, gone bankrupt,
or been adjudged in need of a conservator, wrongfully dissociated? If not,
such a person arguably can participate in winding up. Although a dead
person obviously cannot participate, his personal representative may well
desire to be involved. Illinois provides that a person wrongfully dissociates
only if the dissociation is a "breach of an express provision of the [operating]
agreement." 335 Thus, to preclude a bankrupt or decedent from partici-
pating in winding up, the operating agreement must explicitly forbid death
or bankruptcy ULLCA deals with this issue a little more thoughtfully It
provides that bankruptcy or judicial expulsion constitute wrongful disso-
ciation. 336 Again, though, none of the above dissociating events will nor-
mally cause dissolution.
One of the triggers for dissolution is that the members or managers in
control have acted oppressively.337 Acting oppressively would seem to be
wrongful conduct, but acting oppressively does not cause the actor to dis-
sociate. 338 So here is a situation where, at least initially, a "wrongful" per-
son-i.e., one who oppresses-could participate in winding up-subject
to the oppressed member's right to petition for court supervision "for good
cause shown." 339
The question then arises: what sort of provision makes sense with respect
to who has the authority to wind up an LLC upon dissolution? First of
332. Id.
333. The problematic aspect of each statute is somewhat ameliorated by provisions in each
that permit a member or her legal representative, upon a showing of good cause, to have a
court oversee the winding up process. UNIF. LTD. LiAB. Co. ACT § 803(a), 6A U.L.A. 484
(1995); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/35-4; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-803(a).
334. See supra notes 306-17 and accompanying text.
335. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/35-50(b) (emphasis added).
336. UNIF. LTD. LiAB. Co. ACT § 602(b)(2)(ii), (iii), 6A U.L.A. 474 (1995).
337. Id. § 801(b)(5)(v), 6A U.L.A. 481 (1995); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/35-1(4)(E).
338. A member can be judicially expelled, and thus dissociated, for breaching a fiduciary
duty owed to a member. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 601(6)(ii), 6A U.L.A. 471 (1995).
339. Id. § 803(a), 6A U.L.A. 484 (1995); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/35-4(a).
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all, it does not make sense to tie dissociation into who can wind up in a
statutory scheme where dissociation does not lead to dissolution. Second,
the right to participate should normally lie with those who were members
or managers immediately prior to dissolution, rather than "remaining
members," to avoid the Investcorp problem. 340 Because a withdrawing
member has an economic interest in the winding up process (assuming
withdrawal leads to dissolution), such member should be able to participate
unless there are equitable reasons to deny such participation.
Determination of what conduct would exclude a member from partic-
ipation in winding up should be left to the courts, however, rather than
being statutorily defined-unless the statute is phrased very generally.
Transaction lawyers abhor litigation and tend to believe that statutory
specificity avoids litigation, as generality breeds litigation. If a situation
arises in which one group of members seeks to exclude other members
from participating in winding up, however, rest assured that there will be
litigation. 341 Thus, a statute should simply provide that the members or
managers immediately prior to dissolution may wind-up the LLC unless,
for good cause shown, a court determines otherwise.
VOTING AND DISTRIBUTIONS-PER CAPITA OR PER
CAPITAL
In the move from a partnership model to a more corporate approach
in LLC statutes generally, in one area there has been almost a reverse
trend. Initially most states followed the limited partnership model with
respect to voting, profit sharing, and distributions. ULLCA and Illinois,
however, now employ a general partnership model. 342 In a general part-
nership model, all partners have equal rights in management, 343 and dis-
putes are settled by a majority vote of the partners. 344 In addition, the
partners share equally in the profits.3 45 This is a per capita approach,
whereby decisions are reached or profits are distributed from counting
heads.
340. See supra notes 317-29 and accompanying text.
341. Id.
342. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 404(a), 6A U.L.A. 457 (1995) (voting); 805 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 180/15-1(a); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 405(a), 6A UL.A. 459 (1995) (dis-
tributions); 805 ILL. CoMp. STAT. 180/25-1(a) (distributions).
343. See UNIV. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(e) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 526 (West 1995); UNIF. PART-
NERSHIP ACT § 401(f) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 74 (West Supp. 2000); see also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 205/18(e).
344. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(h) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 526 (West 1995); UNIF. PART-
NERSHIP ACT § 401(j) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 74 (West Supp. 2000); see also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 205/18(h).
345. See UNIF. PARNIRSHIP ACT § 18(a) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 526 (West 1995); UNIF. PART-
NERSHIP AcT § 401(b) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 74 (West Supp. 2000); see also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 205/18(a).
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On the other hand, in a limited partnership, profit sharing and distri-
butions are based upon the capital contributed. 346 Although management
power resides in the general partner,34 7 the limited partners do have certain
voting rights.3 48 Many limited partnership agreements provide that the
limited partners exercise these rights in proportion to their capital contri-
butions. 349 This is aper capital approach, because instead of counting heads,
one counts dollars.
In essence, the corporate model is a per capital approach, because voting
power 350 and right to distributions351 are functions of the number of shares
owned, which, generally, is a function of capital contributed. In the cor-
porate model, however, not only can there be different classes of shares, 352
but also shares can be sold at different prices. 353 Thus, in a closely held
corporation, preferred shares are frequently used to create a partnership
model. If A contributes $1Ox and B contributes $90x, they will each receive
10 shares of common stock with voting power. But B would also receive
$80x of preferred shares that would have a preference on liquidation of
$80x, but no right to vote. Thus, A and B would have equal voting power
and equal rights to profits354 but, upon liquidation, B would receive his
excess contribution of $80x before accumulated profits were distributed
346. See REV. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 503, 504 (1976), 6A U.L.A. 209-10, 212 (West
1995); see also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 210/503, 504.
347. See REV. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 403(a) (1976), 6A U.L.A. 177 (West 1995); see
also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 210/403(a).
348. See REV. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 303(b)(6) (1976), 6A U.L.A. 144-45 (West 1995);
see also 805 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 210/303(b)(6).
349. REV. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 302 (1976), 6A U.L.A. 142 (West 1995) (setting
forth the "the right to vote (on a per capita or other basis)") (emphasis added). See also 805 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 210/302.
350. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.21 (a) (1999) (stating that in general "each outstand-
ing share ... is entitled to one vote"); 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 7-91 (Aspen 3d ed.
1996 Supp.).
351. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.01(a) (providing that "[a]ll shares of a class must
have preferences, limitations, and relative right identical with those of other shares of the
same class"); I MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 6-3 (Aspen 3d ed. 1996 Supp.).
352. Typically, common and preferred shares have different characteristics with the com-
mon having the growth potential and more power, and the preferred more security. Fre-
quently, the preferred does not vote.
353. Clearly, preferred and common shares can be sold at different prices, but the value
of common shares can change over time as well. In addition, with disclosure the same shares
can be sold at different prices though this could, for example, create a tax problem because
of the bargain element.
354. The preferred shares generally would have a preferential dividend before profits
would be distributed to the common share. This preferential dividend would, however, in
the partnership context, be analogous to interest on a loan by a partner. Under the default
provision of the Uniform Partnership Act, partners do not receive interest on capital contri-
butions but could on loans. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(c) (1914), 6 UL.A. 526 (West
1998). Even with respect to capital, interest could be paid because the default provision is
operative. Id.
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equally. Thus, as in a partnership, the shareholders (partners) share equally
in profits35 5 and management, 35 6 and the shareholders effectively 57 re-
ceive a return of their capital contributions before profits are distributed.3 5 8
The early (i.e., pre-1996 ULLCA) statutes generally used a per capita
approach. For example, the default provision in the Illinois statute origi-
nally provided, with respect to voting, .that "all decisions of the members
shall be made by concurrence of the holders of membership interests rep-
resenting a majority of the book value of the membership interests," 359
and, with respect to profits and distributions, such shall be made "on the
basis of the book value of the member's membership interest." 360
Delaware still provides that profits and losses shall be allocated, and
distributions made, "on the basis of the agreed value ... of the contribu-
tions made by each member to the extent... not ... returned." 361 The
default provision with respect to management is also aper capital approach,
because the statute provides that "management ... shall be vested in its
members in proportion to the then current percentage ... of the members
in the profits." 362 As stated above, the default provision for allocating prof-
its is on a per capital basis. With respect to voting, Delaware has a unique
provision: "Voting by members may be on a per capita, number, financial
interest, class, group, or any other basis."'363
ULLCA provides, however, that "each member has equal rights" in
management and decisions are made "by a majority of the members. 364
In addition, "[a]ny distributions ... must be in equal shares. '365 Illinois
has essentially the same provisions. 366 Thus, there is a return to the general
partnership model.
Which approach is better from the perspective of a default provision in
a statute? It is important to recognize that the approach which is chosen
can have significant impact. Consider the example at the beginning of this
section where A invested $lOx and B invested $90x. This is a typical
"Work/Money" partnership. Ifper capital is the default, and A and B simply
355. Id. at § 18(a).
356. Id. at § 18(e).
357. In the corporate context, using preferred shares as in the above example, only the
"excess" capital contribution is first repaid. The balance of the capital contribution is repaid
in connection with distribution of the funds remaining after the preferred gets its first bite.
358. UNIV. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 40(b)(iii) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 901 (West 1995); see also 805
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/40(b)(iii). The 1997 Uniform Partnership Act eliminated the
distinction between distributions in respect of capital and those in respect of profits.
359. 1992 111. Laws 2529 § 10-5(a).
360. Id. § 20-10, 20-15.
361. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-503, 504.
362. Id. § 18-402.
363. Id. § 18-302(a).
364. UNWV. LTD. LIA. Co. ACT § 404(a)(1), (2), 6A U.L.A. 457 (1995).
365. Id. § 405(a), 6A U.L.A. 459 (1995).
366. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/15-1(a)(1), (2); 25-1(a).
HeinOnline  -- 56 Bus. Law.  568 2000-2001
Limited Liability Companies in the Decade of the 1990s 569
assumed that, by forming an LLC, they were partners, we could expect A
to be very unhappy. B has absolute control and ninety percent of the
profits. On the other hand, a per capita approach would provide the equality
they arguably desire, having thought of themselves as partners, and would
provide equality in sharing profits, but would not compensate B for his
"excess" contribution. Nonetheless, in most circumstances, the per capita
approach achieves greater "equity" and captures more of the likely in-
tended consequences than a per capital approach.
To return to an earlier model: 367 if we posit two types of businesses, one
well-capitalized with sophisticated investors and the other more modest
with unsophisticated investors, using the per capita approach as a default
role makes the most sense. This gives each member equal rights in man-
agement. The per capita approach also gives each member equal interests
in distributions. Is this fair? With respect to distributions, both per capita
and per capital reach the same result when the capital contributions of the
members are equal. If the capital contributions are substantially dissimilar,
as in the A/B example above, such as when "x" equals 1000 or more, 368
B has a sufficiently large financial stake that it makes economic sense for
him to seek the advice of competent counsel. In such a situation, counsel
would likely recommend a combination of common and preferred inter-
ests, as would be the case in the corporate example discussed above.369
This would provide B with an additional return on the extra investment
he made so as to restore equity.
Phrased differently, if the capital investments are so substantial as to
make a significant difference between the per capita and per capital ap-
proaches, it is likely that the parties are sophisticated and will engage
sophisticated counsel to draft a sophisticated agreement. The default pro-
vision will pertain only when the operating agreement is silent on these
issues. In such a situation, the task of the legislature is to choose a default
result which is likely to do the least damage in most situations. Going back
to the A/B example, a per capital approach leaves A in a totally impotent
position. On the other hand, a per capita approach not only achieves some
basic equity but also provides B with the blocking leverage that a fifty-fifty
position holds so as to enhance his negotiating position.
CONCLUSION
What the foregoing analysis demonstrates is that the flurry of legislative
activity, not just in enacting LLC legislation at the outset but in amending
it in response to changes in the tax laws, has created an unstable situation
in which counsel must master not only complex and changing legislation
367. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
368. IfA contributes $lox and B $90x, then A would contribute $10,000 and B $90,000
if x= 1000.
369. See supra notes 357-61 and accompanying text.
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but also case law which may or may not be applicable depending upon
legislative changes in the interim.
There is something to be said for a moratorium on the constant tinker-
ing or, in some cases, complete overhaul that is going on with LLC statutes.
On the other hand, because they were enacted in relative haste, there are
glitches and the instinct to tinker may be hard to overcome.
Contractarians are among the strongest proponents of LLCs because of
the great flexibility in drafting operating agreements and because of the
opportunity to constrain wasteful legal concepts like fiduciary duties.
370
But contractarians are also focused upon efficiency. Consider the past de-
cade: A flurry of legislative activity with respect to business organizations,
driven largely by tax considerations. A change in the tax regulations, lib-
eralizing the circumstances under which a business organization can be
taxed as a partnership. Another flurry of legislative activity to remove what
were perceived as glitches in the original legislation and to limit the cir-
cumstances under which the entity would be dissolved, in order to make
the LLC form a more stable form of organization. Judges, and counsel
around the country, are struggling with a new form of business organiza-
tion and with new procedures and new concepts. Has this been an efficient
use of legislative, judicial, and lawyer energy?
On the other hand, post-World War II developments in corporate law
have resulted in a Model Act which, for the most part, has been adopted
in a majority of states. There have also been case law developments, such
as Galler v. aaller37 1 in Illinois, which empowered shareholders in closely
held corporations to adopt wide-ranging and comprehensive shareholder
agreements even though such agreements were at odds with some norms
of corporate law, and Donohue v. Rodd Electrotype372 in Massachusetts, which
recognized that controlling shareholders in a close corporation owe mi-
nority shareholders a duty of fairness akin to that which partners owe each
other. These decisions have been cited as precedent in many jurisdictions.
Accordingly, there is a fairly uniform and flexible body of corporate law
throughout the states.
The question then arises: was all this LLC activity necessary or was
there a better way that the ends sought by the LLC legislation could have
been achieved? The answer is simple. All that needed to have been done
was to amend the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to add one sentence: "A
non-publicly traded corporation may elect to be taxed as a partnership by
filing an election with .... ." With the advent of LLCs, any argument that
the Treasury had that business entities with limited liability should be
precluded from seeking to be taxed as partnerships are long gone.
370. Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 Bus.
LAw. 45, 53-62 (1993).
371. 203 N.E.2d 577 (11. 1964).
372. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
HeinOnline  -- 56 Bus. Law.  570 2000-2001
Limited Liability Companies in the Decade of the 1990s 571
Will the IRC be so amended? Probably not. Because this would entail
legislation, the Republicans and the Democrats would need to come to-
gether, whereas the check-the-box regulations were implemented admin-
istratively Moreover, there is now a cadre of lawyers and accountants with
expertise in this area who would resist any change because their unique
knowledge is now a valuable asset. But there are thousands more lawyers
and accountants in small firms and small communities, to say nothing of
judges, who would appreciate a simplification of the law regarding business
organizations and would prefer the option merely to deal with a form of
business organization, namely, the corporation, that is far better under-
stood by a far greater range of people than the LLC.
If returning to the pre-LLC days is not feasible because of the difficulty
in amending the IRC, and if the urge to tinker with the existing LLC
legislation is irresistible, as it probably is, then there is a definite need for
a uniform act that is widely adopted. Business law should have a certain
degree of predictability. With numerous statutory models in place, which
in turn are amended from year to year, not only does this place a heavy
burden on transaction lawyers to master a wide array of statutory provi-
sions, but also it impedes the development of a body of case law which is
meaningful across the country.
ULLCA is not a perfect statutory resolution. At a bare minimum, its
fiduciary duty provisions should be modified along the line of the Illinois
legislation. The perfect is the enemy of the good, however. ULLCA is a
good start toward developing a uniform body of legislation. The alternative
is a hodge-podge of legislation, borrowing principles from other bodies of
law, such as other uniform acts, and existing corporate statutes. The al-
ternative to a uniform approach also presents the spectre of decades before
a meaningful body of case law develops. It makes continuing legal edu-
cation, both for lawyers and judge, more difficult and less efficient. As we
move to more of a multi-state practice of law, it makes such practice less
efficient.
ULLCA deserves more consideration. It would help if the Uniform
Commissioners would revisit the fiduciary duty provision of ULLCA, how-
ever, and bring them more in line with existing case law and sound public
policy.
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APPENDIX 1
Alabama Limited Liability Company Act, ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-1
through 10-12-61 (1994).
Alaska Limited Liability Company Act, ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.50.010
through 10.50.995 (Michie 1996).
Arizona Limited Liability Company Act, ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-
601 through 29-857 (West 1996).
Arkansas Small Business Entity Tax Pass Through Act, ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 4-32-101 through 4-32-1316 (Michie 1996).
California Beverly-Killea Limited Liability Company Act, CAL. CORP.
CODE §§ 17000 through 17705 (West 1997).
Colorado Limited Liability Company Act, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 7-80-101 through 7-80-1006 (West Supp. 1994).
Connecticut Limited Liability Company Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 34-100 through 34-242 (West 1996).
Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§§ 18-101 through 18-1109 (1993 & Supp. 1996).
Florida Limited Liability Company Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 608.401
through 608.514 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997).
Georgia Limited Liability Company Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-11 - 100
through 14-11-1109 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
Hawaii Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 428-101 through 428-1302 (Michie Supp. 1996).
Idaho Limited Liability Company Act, IDAHO CODE §§ 53-601 through
53-672 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
Illinois Limited Liability Company Act, 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
180/1-1 through 180/60-1 (West 1996).
Indiana Business Flexibility Act, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-18-1-1 through
23-18-13-1 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1996).
Iowa Limited Liability Company Act, IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 490A. 100
through 490A. 1601 (West Supp. 1996).
Kansas Limited Liability Company Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7601
through 17-7652 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
Kentucky Limited Liability Company Act, KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 275.001 through 275.455 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1996).
Louisiana Limited Liability Company Law, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 12:1301 through 1369 (West 1994).
Maine Limited Liability Company Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31,
§§ 601 through 762 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996).
Maryland Limited Liability Company Act, MD. CODE ANN., CORPS.
& ASS'NS §§ 4A-101 through 4A- 1103 (1993 & Supp. 1994).
Massachusetts Limited Liability Company Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 156C, §§ 1 through 68 (1996).
Michigan Limited Liability Company Act, MiCH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 450.4101 through 450- 5200 (West Supp. 1996).
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Minnesota Limited Liability Company Act, MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 322B.01 through 322B.960 (West Supp. 1997).
Mississippi Limited Liability Company Act, MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-
29-101 through 79-29- 1204 (1996).
Missouri Limited Liability Company Act, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 347.0 10
through 347.740 (West Supp. 1997).
Montana Limited Liability Company Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-
8-101 through 35-8-1307 (1996).
Nebraska Limited Liability Company Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2601
through 21-2653 (Supp. 1996).
Nevada Limited Liability Company Act, NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 86.010
through 86.571 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
New Hampshire Limited Liability Company Act, N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 304-C:1 through 304-D:20 (Supp. 1996).
NewJersey Limited Liability Company Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:2B-1
through 42:2B-70 (West Supp. 1996).
New Mexico Limited Liability Company Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-
19-1 through 53-19-74 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1996).
New York Limited Liability Company Act, N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAw
§§ 101 through 1403 (McKinney Supp. 1997).
North Carolina Limited Liability Company Act, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 57C-1-101 through 57C-10-07 (1993 & Supp. 1996).
North Dakota Limited Liability Act, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-32-01
through 10-320155 (1995).
Ohio Limited Liability Company Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 1705.01 through 1705.58 (West Supp. 1997)
Oklahoma Limited Liability Company Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§§ 2000 through 2060 (West Supp. 1997)
Oregon Limited Liability Company Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 63.001
through 63.990 (Supp. 1996).
Pennsylvania Limited Liability Company Law, 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 8901 through 8998 (West 1995).
Rhode Island Limited Liability Company Act, R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 7-
16-1 through 7-16-75 (1992 & Supp. 1996).
South Carolina Limited Liability Company Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-
44-101 through 33-44-1201 (West Supp. 2000).
South Dakota Limited Liability Company Act, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§§ 47-34-1 through 47-34-59 (Michie Supp. 1996).
Tennessee Limited Liability Company Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-
201-101 through 48-248-606 (1995).
Texas Limited Liability Company Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
Art. 1528n §§ 1.01 through 11.07 (West Supp. 1997).
Utah Limited Liability Company Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2b-10 l
through 48-2b-158 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
Vermont Limited Liability Company Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 3001 through 3161 (1997).
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Virginia Limited Liability Company Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1000
through 13.1-1121 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1996).
Washington Limited Liability Company Act, Wash. Rev. Code
§§ 25.15.005 through 25.15.902 (West Supp. 2000).
West Virginia Limited Liability Company Act, W VA. CODE §§ 31 B-I-
101 through 31B-13-1306 (1996).
Wisconsin Limited Liability Company Act, Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 183.0102 through 183.1305 (West Supp. 1996).
Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-
101 through 17-15-144 (Michie 1977 & Supp. 1996).
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APPENDIX 2
Section 15-3 of the Illinois LLC Act, 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/15-3
(West 2000), provides as follows:
(a) The fiduciary duties a member owes to a member-managed com-
pany and its other members include the duty of loyalty and the duty
of care referred to in subsections (b) and (c) of this Section.
(b) A member's duty of loyalty to a member-managed company and its
other members includes the following:
(1) to account to the company and to hold as trustee for it any
property, profit, or benefit derived by the member in the con-
duct or winding up of the company's business or derived from
a use by the member of the company's property, including the
appropriation of a company's opportunity;
(2) to act fairly when a member deals with the company in the
conduct or winding up of the company's business as or on be-
half of a party having an interest adverse to the company; and
(3) to refrain from competing with the company in the conduct of
the company's business before the dissolution of the company.
(c) A member's duty of care to a member-managed company and its
other members in the conduct of a winding up of the company's
business is limited to refraining from engaging in grossly negligent
or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation
of law.
(d) A member shall discharge his or her duties to a member-managed
company and its other members under this Act or under the oper-
ating agreement and exercise any rights consistent with the obligation
of good faith and fair dealing.
(e) A member of a member-managed company does not violate a duty
or obligation under this Act or under the operating agreement merely
because the member's conduct furthers the member's own interest.
(f) This Section applies to a person winding up the limited liability com-
pany's business as the personal or legal representative of the last
surviving member as if the person were a member.
(g) In a manager-managed company:
(1) a member who is not also a manager owes no duties to the
company or to the other members solely by reason of being a
member;
(2) a manager is held to the same standards of conduct prescribed
for members in subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) of this Section;
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(3) a member who pursuant to the operating agreement exercises
some or all of the authority of a manager in the management
and conduct of the company's business is held to the standards
of conduct in subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) of this Section to
the extent that the member exercises the managerial authority
vested in a manager by this Act; and
(4) a manager is relieved of liability imposed by law for violations
of the standards prescribed by subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) to
the extent of the managerial authority delegated to the mem-
bers by the operating agreement.
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APPENDIX 3
The following table attempts to break down the fiduciary duty provisions,
or lack thereof, for each state, based upon the closest "model" which they
approximate. The models used are (i) ULLCA § 409, Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act, 6 A U.L.A. 429-508 (App. 4); (ii) Uniform Part-
nership Act (1914) § 21, 6 U.L.A. 608 (App. 5); (iii) Revised Uniform Lim-
ited Partnership Act (1976) § 107, 6A U.L.A. 94 (App. 5); (iv) Delaware
General Corporation Law § 144, 8 Del. Code § 18-144 (App. 6); and
(v) Model Business Corporation Act § 8.30, 2 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann.
8-165 (3d ed. 1998, 1999 Supp.) (App. 7). Section 8.30 essentially deals
with the duty of care and does not deal with the duty of loyalty or other
fiduciary duties. Accordingly, in the text, states having only a § 8.30 type
provision are treated as not having a statutory provision on fiduciary duty.
States that have a provision similar to RULPA § 107 are also treated as
not having a fiduciary duty provision. See supra note 118. Section 107 was
not intended to abrogate fiduciary duties. Id.
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APPENDIX 4
ULLCA § 409, 6A U.L.A. 464-465, provides as follows:
(a) The only fiduciary duties a member owes to a member-managed
company and its other members are the duty of loyalty and the duty of
care imposed by subsections (b) and (c).
(b) A member's duty of loyalty to a member-managed company and its
other members is limited to the following: (1) to account to the company
and to hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or benefit derived by the
member in the conduct or winding up of the company's business or derived
from a use by the member of the company's property, including the ap-
propriation of a company's opportunity; (2) to refrain from dealing with
the company in the conduct or winding up of the company's business as
or on behalf of a party having an interest adverse to the company; and
(3) to refrain from competing with the company in the conduct of the
company's business before the dissolution of the company.
(c) A member's duty of care to a member-managed company and its
other members in the conduct of and winding up of the company's busi-
ness is limited to refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless
conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law.
(d) A member shall discharge the duties to a member-managed company
and its other members under this [Act] or under the operating agreement
and exercise any rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and
fair dealing.
(e) A member of a member-managed company does not violate a duty
or obligation under this [Act] or under the operating agreement merely
because the member's conduct furthers the member's own interest.
(f) A member of a member-managed company may lend money to and
transact other business with the company. As to each loan or transaction,
the rights and obligations of the member are the same as those of a person
who is not a member, subject to other applicable law.
(g) This section applies to a person winding up the company's business
as the personal or legal representative of the last surviving member as if
the person were a member.
(h) In a manager-managed company: (1) a member who is not also a
manager owes no duties to the company or to the other members solely
by reason of being a member; (2) a manager is held to the same standards
of conduct prescribed for members in subsections (b) through (f); (3) a
member who pursuant to the operating agreement exercises some or all
of the rights of a manager in the management and conduct of the com-
pany's business is held to the standards of conduct in subsections (b)
through (f) to the extent that the member exercises the managerial au-
thority vested in a manager by this [Act]; and (4) a manager is relieved of
liability imposed by law for violation of the standards prescribed by sub-
sections (b) through (f) to the extent of the managerial authority delegated
to the members by the operating agreement.
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APPENDIX 5
Section 21 of the Uniform Partnership Act, 6 U.L.A. 608, provides as
follows:
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and
hold as trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent
of the other partners from any transaction connected with the for-
mation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any use
by him of its property.
Section 107 of the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 6A U.L.A.
94, provides as follows:
Except as provided in the partnership agreement, a partner may lend
money to and transact other business with the limited partnership
and, subject to other applicable law, has the same rights and obliga-
tions with respect thereto as a person who is not a partner.
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APPENDIX 6
Section 144 of the Delaware General Corporation Act, 8 DEL. CODE tit.
6, § 8-144, provides as follows:
(a) No contract or transaction between a corporation and 1 or more of
its directors or officers, or between a corporation and any other corpo-
ration, partnership, association, or other organization in which 1 or more
of its directors or officers, or have a financial interest, shall be void or
voidable solely for this reason, or solely because the director or officer is
present at or participates in the meeting of the board or committee which
authorizes the contract or transaction, or solely because his or their votes
are counted for such purpose, if-
(1) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the
contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to the board of directors
or the committee, and the board or committee in good faith authorizes
the contract or transaction by the affirmative votes of a majority of the
disinterested directors, even though the disinterested directors be less than
a quorum; or
(2) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the
contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to the shareholders
entitled to vote thereon, and the contract or transaction is specifically
approved in good faith by vote of the shareholders; or
(3) The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the
time it is authorized, approved or ratified, by the board of directors, a
committee, or the shareholders.
(b) Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the
presence of a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or of a com-
mittee which authorizes the contract or transaction.
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APPENDIX 7
Section 8.30 of the Model Business Corporation Act, 2 MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. 8-160 (3d ed. 1999 Supp.), provides as follows:
(b) Each member of the board of directors, when discharging the duties
of a director, shall act: (1) in good faith, and (2) in a manner the director
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.
(c) The members of the board of directors or a committee of the board,
when becoming informed in connection with their decision-making func-
tion or devoting attention to their oversight function, shall discharge their
duties with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably
believe appropriate under similar circumstances.
(d) In discharging board or committee duties a director, who does not
have knowledge that makes reliance unwarranted, is entitled to rely on the
performance by any of the persons specified in subsection (e)(1) or subsec-
tion (e)(3) to whom the board may have delegated, formally or informally
by course of conduct, the authority or duty to perform one or more of the
board's functions that are delegable under applicable law.
(e) In discharging board or committee duties a director, who does not
have knowledge that makes reliance unwarranted, is entitled to rely on
information, opinions, reports or statements, including financial state-
ments and other financial data, prepared or presented by any of the per-
sons specified in subsection (e).
(f) A director is entitled to rely, in accordance with subsection (c) or (d),
on:
(1) one or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the
director reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the functions
performed or the information, opinions, reports or statements provided;
(2) legal counsel, public accountants, or other persons retained by the
corporation as to matters involving skills or expertise the director reason-
ably believes are matters (i) within the particular person's professional or
expert competence or (ii) as to which the particular person merits confi-
dence; or
(3) a committee of the board of directors of which the director is not a
member if the director reasonably believes the committee merits confi-
dence.
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APPENDIX 8
Section 301.7701-2 (Associations), 26 C.YR. § 301.7701.2 (1995), provides
as follows:
(a) Characteristics of corporations. (1) The term "association" refers to
an organization whose characteristics require it to be classified for purposes
of taxation as a corporation rather than as another type of organization
such as a partnership or a trust. There are a number of major character-
istics ordinarily found in a pure corporation which, taken together, distin-
guish it from other organizations. These are: (i) Associates, (ii) an objective
to carry on business and divided the gains therefrom, (iii) continuity of life,
(iv) centralization of management, (v) liability for corporate debts limited
to corporate property, and (vi) free transferability of interests. Whether a
particular organization is to be classified as an association must be deter-
mined by taking into account the presence or absence of each of these
corporate characteristics. The presence or absence of these characteristics
will depend upon the facts in each individual case. In addition to the major
characteristics set forth in this subparagraph other factors may be found
in some cases which may be significant in classifying an organization as
an association, a partnership, or a trust. An organization will be treated
as an association if the corporate characteristics are such that the orga-
nization more nearly resembles a corporation than a partnership or trust.
See Morrissey et al. v. Commissioner (1935) 296 U.S. 344.
(2) Since associates and an objective to carry on business for joint profit
are essential characteristics of all organizations engaged in business for
profit (other than the so-called one-man corporation and the sole propri-
etorship), the absence of either of these essential characteristics will cause
an arrangement among co-owners of property for the development of such
property for the separate profit of each not to be classified as an association.
Some of the major characteristics of a corporation are common to trusts
and corporations, and others are common to partnerships and corpora-
tions. Characteristics common to trusts and corporations are not material
in attempting to distinguish between a trust and an association, and char-
acteristics common to partnerships and corporations are not material in
attempting to distinguish betwpen an association and a partnership. For
example, since centralization of management, continuity of life, free trans-
ferability of interests, and limited liability are generally common to trusts
and corporations, the determination of whether a trust which has such
characteristics is to be treated for tax purposes as a trust or as an associ-
ation depends on whether there are associates and an objective to carry
on business and divide the gains therefrom. On the other hand, since
associates and an objective to carry on business and divide the gains there-
from are generally common to both corporations and partnerships, the
determination of whether an organization which has such characteristics
is to be treated for tax purposes as a partnership or as an association
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depends on whether there exists centralization of management, continuity
of life, free transferability of interests, and limited liability.
(3) An unincorporated organization shall not be classified as an associ-
ation unless such organization has more corporate characteristics than
noncorporate characteristics. In determining whether an organization has
more corporate characterisctics than noncorporate characteristics, all
characteristics common to both types of organizations shall not be consid-
ered. For example, if a limited partnership has centralized management
and free transferability of interests but lacks continuity of life and limited
liability, and if the limited partnership has no other characteristics which
are significant in determining its classification, such limited partnership is
not classified as an association. Although the limited partnership also has
associates and an objective to carry on business and divide the gains there-
from, these characteristics are not considered because they are common
to both corporations and partnerships.
(4) The rules of this section and §§ 301.7701-3 and 301.7701-4 are ap-
plicable only to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1960. How-
ever, for any taxable year beginning after December 31, 1960, but before
October 1, 1961, any amendment of the agreement establishing the or-
ganization will, in the case of an organization in existence on November
17, 1960, be treated for purposes of determining the classification of the
organization as being in effect as of the beginning of such taxable year
(i) if the amendment of the agreement is made before October 1, 1961,
and (ii) if the amendment results in the classification of the organization
under the rules of this section and §§ 301.7701-1, 301.7701-3, and
301.7701-4 in the same manner as the organization was classified for tax
purposes on November 17, 1960. The third sentence of paragraph (b)(1)
of this section is applicable to taxable years beginning on or afterJune 14,
1993. However, a taxpayer may apply the third sentence of paragraph
(b)(1) of this section for taxable years beginning beforeJune 14, 1993.
(5) All references in this section to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
shall be deemed to refer both to the original Uniform Limited Partnership
Act (adopted in 1916) and to the revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act
(adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in 1976).
(b) Continuity of life. (1) An organization has continuity of life if the
death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any
member will not cause a dissolution of the organization. On the other
hand, if the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expul-
sion of any member will cause a dissolution of the organization, continuity
of life does not exist. If the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resig-
nation, expulsion, or other event of withdrawal of a general partner of a
limited partnership causes a dissolution of the partnership, continuity of
life does not exist; furthermore, continuity of life does not exist notwith-
standing the fact that a dissolution of the limited partnership may be
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avoided, upon such an event of withdrawal of a general partner, by the
remaining general partners agreeing to continue the partnership or by at
least a majority in interest of the remaining partners agreeing to continue
the partnership. See Glensder Textile Co. v. Commissioner, 46 B.TA. 176
(1942), acq., 1942-1 C.B. 8.
(2) For purposes of this paragraph, dissolution of an organization means
an alteration of the identity of an organization by reason of a change in
the relationship between its members as determined under local law. For
example, since the resignation of a partner from a general partnership
destroys the mutual agency which exists between such partner and his
copartners and thereby alters the personal relation between the partners
which constitutes the identity of the partnership itself, the resignation of a
partner dissolves the partnership. A corporation, however, has a continuing
identity which is detached from the relationship between its stockholders.
The death, insanity, or bankruptcy of a shareholder or the sale of a share-
holder's interest has no effect upon the identity of the corporation and,
therefore, does not work a dissolution of the organization. An agreement
by which an organization is established may provide that the business will
be continued by the remaining members in the event of the death or
withdrawal of any member, but such agreement does not establish conti-
nuity of life if under local law the death or withdrawal of any member
causes a dissolution of the organization. Thus, there may be a dissolution
of the organization and no continuity of life although the business is con-
tinued by the remaining members.
(3) An agreement establishing an organization may provide that the
organization is to continue for a stated period or until the completion of
a stated undertaking or such agreement may provide for the termination
of the organization at will or otherwise. In determining whether any mem-
ber has the power of dissolution, it will be necessary to examine the agree-
ment and to ascertain the effect of such agreement under local law. For
example, if the agreement expressly provides that the organization can be
terminated by the will of any member, it is clear that the organization lacks
continuity of life. However, if the agreement provides that the organization
is to continue for a stated period or until the completion of a stated trans-
action, the organization has continuity of life if the effect of the agreement
is that no member has the power to dissolve the organization in contra-
vention of the agreement. Nevertheless, if, notwithstanding such agree-
ment, any member has the power under local law to dissolve the organi-
zation, the organization lacks continuity of life. Accordingly, a general
partnership subject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform Partnership
Act and a limited partnership subject to a statute corresponding to the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act both lack continuity of life.
(c) Centralization of management. (1) An organization has centralized
management if any person (or any group of persons which does not include
all the members) has continuing exclusive authority to make the manage-
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ment decisions necessary to the conduct of the business for which the
organization was formed. Thus, the persons who are vested with such
management authority resemble in powers and functions the directors of
a statutory corporation. The effective operation of a business organization
composed of many members generally depends upon the centralization in
the hands of a few of exclusive authority to make management decisions
for the organization, and therefore, centralized management is more likely
to be found in such an organization than in a smaller organization.
(2) The persons who have such authority may, or may not, be members
of the organization and may hold office as a result of a selection by the
members from time to time, or may be self-perpetuating in office. See
Morrissey et a]. v. Commissioner (1935) 296 U.S. 344. Centralized man-
agement can be accomplished by election to office, by proxy appointment,
or by any other means which has the effect of concentrating in a man-
agement group continuing exclusive authority to make management de-
cisions.
(3) Centralized management means a concentration of continuing ex-
clusive authority to make independent business decisions on behalf of the
organization which do not require ratification by members of such orga-
nization. Thus, there is not centralized management when the centralized
authority is merely to perform ministerial acts as an agent at the direction
of a principal.
(4) There is no centralization of continuing exclusive authority to make
management decisions, unless the managers have sole authority to make
such decisions. For example, in the case of a corporation or a trust, the
concentration of management powers in a board of directors or trustees
effectively prevents a stockholder or a trust beneficiary, simply because he
is a stockholder or beneficiary, from binding the corporation or the trust
by his acts. However, because of the mutual agency relationship between
members of a general partnership subject to a statute corresponding to
the Uniform Partnership Act, such a general partnership cannot achieve
effective concentration of management powers and, therefore, centralized
management. Usually, the act of any partner within the scope of the part-
nership business binds all the partners; and even if the partners agree
among themselves that the powers of management shall be exclusively in
a selected few, this agreement will be ineffective as against an outsider who
had no notice of it. In addition, limited partnerships subject to a statute
corresponding to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, generally do not
have centralized management, but centralized management ordinarily
does exist in such a limited partnership if substantially all the interests in
the partnership are owned by the limited partners. Furthermore, if all or
a specified group of the limited partners may remove a general partner,
all the facts and circumstances must be taken into account in determining
whether the partnership possesses centralized management. A substan-
tially restricted right of the limited partners to remove the general partner
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(e.g., in the event of the general partner's gross negligence, self-dealing, or
embezzlement) will not itself cause the partnership to possess centralized
management.
(d) Limited liability. (1) An organization has the corporate characteristic
of limited liability if under local law there is no member who is personally
liable for the debts of or claims against the organization. Personal liability
means that a creditor of an organization may seek personal satisfaction
from a member of the organization to the extent that the assets of such
organization are insufficient to satisfy the creditor's claim. A member of
the organization who is personally liable for the obligations of the orga-
nization may make an agreement under which another person, whether
or not a member of the organization, assumes such liability or agrees to
indemnify such member for any such liability. However, if under local law
the member remains liable to such creditors notwithstanding such agree-
ment, there exists personal liability with respect to such member. In the
case of a general partnership subject to a statute corresponding to the
Uniform Partnership Act, personal liability exists with respect to each gen-
eral partner. Similarly, in the case of a limited partnership subject to a
statute corresponding to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, personal
liability exists with respect to each general partner, except as provided in
subparagraph (2) of this paragraph (d).
(2) In the case of an organization formed as a limited partnership, per-
sonal liability does not exist, for purposes of this paragraph, with respect
to a general partner when he has no substantial assets (other than his
interest in the partnership) which could be reached by a creditor of the
organization and when he is merely a "dummy" acting as the agent of the
limited partners. Notwithstanding the formation of the organization as a
limited partnership, when the limited partners act as the principals of such
general partner, personal liability will exist with respect to such limited
partners. Also, if a corporation is a general partner, personal liability exists
with respect to such general partner when the corporation has substantial
assets (other than its interest in the partnership) which could be reached
by a creditor of the limited partnership. A general partner may contribute
his services, but no capital, to the organization, but if such general partner
has substantial assets (other than his interest in the partnership), there exists
personal liability. Furthermore, if the organization is engaged in financial
transactions which involve large sums of money, and if the general partners
have substantial assets (other than their interests in the partnership), there
exists personal liability although the assets of such general partners would
be insufficient to satisfy any substantial portion of the obligations of the
organization. In addition, although the general partner has no substantial
assets (other than his interest in the partnership), personal liability exists
with respect to such general partner when he is not merely a "dummy"
acting as the agent of the limited partners. If the limited partnership agree-
ment provides that a general partner is not personally liable to creditors
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for the debts of the partnership (other than debts for which another general
partner is personally liable), it shall be presumed that personal liability
does not exist with respect to that partner unless it is established that the
provision is ineffective under local law.
(e) Free transferability of interests. (1) An organization has the corporate
characteristic of free transferability of interests if each of its members or
those members owning substantially all of the interests in the organization
have the power, without the consent of other members, to substitute for
themselves in the same organization a person who is not a member of the
organization. In order for this power of substitution to exist in the cor-
porate sense, the member must be able, without the consent of other mem-
bers, to confer upon his substitute all the attributes of his interest in the
organization. Thus, the characteristic of free transferability of interests
does not exist in a case in which each member can, without the consent
of other members, assign only his right to share in profits but cannot so
assign his rights to participate in the management of the organization.
Furthermore, although the agreement provides for the transfer of a mem-
ber's interest, there is no power of substitution and no free transferability
of interest if under local law a transfer of a member's interest results in the
dissolution of the old organization and the formation of a new organiza-
tion.
(2) If each member of an organization can transfer his interest to a
person who is not a member of the organization only after having offered
such interest to the other members at its fair market value, it will be rec-
ognized that a modified form of free transferability of interests exists. In
determining the classification of an organization, the presence of this mod-
ified corporate characteristic will be accorded less significance than if such
characteristic were present in an unmodified form.
(f) Cross reference. See paragraph (b) of§ 301.7701-3 for the application
to limited partnerships of the rules relating to corporate characteristics.
(g) Examples. The application of the rules described in this section may
be illustrated by the following examples.
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